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MEAD AS (MOSTLY) MOOT: PREDICTIVE 
INTERPRETATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Ryan D. Doerfler† 
In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services, the Supreme Court explained that, within the domain of unclear 
agency-administered statutes, a federal court is subordinate to an 
administering agency. When an administering agency speaks 
authoritatively, federal court practice reflects this. When an agency speaks 
only informally, however, federal court practice does not. Specifically, when 
construing an agency-administered statute absent an authoritative agency 
interpretation, a federal court errs, given its subordinate status, when it 
exercises independent judgment concerning what interpretation is best. 
Instead, that subordinate status requires a court to predict what 
authoritative interpretation the administering agency would adopt—just as 
a federal court would predict how a state’s highest court would answer 
some unsettled question of state law. Adhering to this predictive approach 
requires in turn that a court assign significant—in most cases dispositive—
evidentiary weight to agency interpretations contained within certain 
legally nonbinding instruments, in particular legal briefs. This is because 
the non-authoritative interpretations contained in such instruments will 
most often constitute the best available evidence concerning what an 
administering agency would say if it were to speak authoritatively. This 
conclusion is surprising given the central holding of United States v. Mead 
Corp. that interpretations contained in nonbinding instruments are not 
entitled to controlling deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. What this article will suggest is that the 
central holding of Mead ought to be mostly moot since, even where 
controlling deference is not owed de jure, it is most often owed de facto. 
 
 †  Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law 
School. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Daniel Abebe, Jake Gersen, John 
Manning, Jonathan Masur, Philip Mayor, Matthew Stephenson, and Henry Weissmann. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When making sense of unclear administrative statutes, courts 
operate as subordinates. While “[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”1 the tasks of 
enacting and executing it are, as a rule, left to the other branches.2 And, 
beginning with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,3 courts have come to regard the task of construing an 
unclear4 term or provision within an agency-administered statute less as 
 
 1 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 2 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1962) (“[T]he 
policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral process, is the 
distinguishing characteristic of the [democratic] system.”); Felix Frankfurter, Associate Justice, 
The Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture: Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (Mar. 18, 1947), 
available at http://mtweb.mtsu.edu/cewillis/Hermeneutics/Frankfurter%20Reading%20
Statutes.pdf (“In a democracy the legislative impulse and its expression should come from those 
popularly chosen to legislate, and equipped to devise policy, as courts are not.”). 
 3 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 4 While both courts and commentators typically treat “ambiguity” as a blanket term for 
textual unclarity, strictly speaking, “ambiguity” constitutes only a subset of unclarity. A text is 
“ambiguous” only insofar as it admits of more than one distinct meaning (e.g., a text in which the 
term “bank” might refer to a riverbank or a financial bank). By contrast, a text is also unclear if it 
is “vague,” i.e., insofar as its precise extension is uncertain (e.g., a text in which it is unclear 
whether the extension of the phrase “the elderly” includes individuals who are sixty-two years 
old). See, e.g., Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in THE OXFORD 
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one of “say[ing] what the law is”5 than as some mixture of declaring 
what the law shall be and carrying it into effect.6 Understanding that 
mixed task as one principally assigned to the relevant administering 
agency,7 courts have, in turn, taken up the now familiar practice of 
deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpretation where unclarity exists 
within a statute that an agency administers.8 Because agencies, not 
courts, have “primary interpretive authority” within that domain,9 that 
courts afford Chevron deference to agency interpretations is, according 
to this picture, simply a reflection of those courts’ subordinate status.10 
While the way that courts behave when agencies speak—
authoritatively, at least—respects the hierarchical relationship between 
them, what this Article will suggest is that the way that courts behave 
when agencies have yet to speak does not. More specifically, what this 
Article will argue is that, when acting in the absence of an authoritative 
agency interpretation, courts err, in light of their status as interpretive 
subordinates, in exercising independent judgment as to what 
interpretation they think would be best. Instead, that subordinate status 
compels courts to predict what authoritative interpretation the relevant 
 
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 128, 128–29 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, eds., 
2012). As a doctrinal matter, Chevron commands deference in cases of vagueness and ambiguity 
alike. See 467 U.S. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). As a matter of principle, however, one could 
at least argue that a claim of implicit delegation is far more plausible with respect to instances of 
vagueness (e.g., whether “bank” refers to a credit union) than with respect to instances of 
ambiguity (e.g., whether “bank” refers to a riverbank or a financial bank). 
 5  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
 6 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations 
of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617–18 (1996) (“Chevron is grounded in the modern 
constitutional principle that Congress can delegate significant ‘legislative’ policymaking discretion 
to agencies . . . .”); see also A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Holland, 472 F.3d 148, 168 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(“Once that gap was created, the agency was left with an open policy space, which was the 
quintessence of legislative-type action to which Chevron deference was due.” (citation omitted)). 
 7 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a 
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.” (footnote omitted)). 
 8 See id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”(footnote omitted)). 
 9 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative 
Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1273 (2002). 
 10 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 
(2005) (“Chevron teaches that a court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an 
agency is charged with administering is not authoritative . . . .”); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 
517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (“We accord deference to agencies under Chevron . . . because of a 
presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an 
agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and 
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity 
allows.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
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agency would put forward. Adhering to this predictive approach 
requires in turn that courts assign significant—in most cases 
dispositive—evidentiary weight to agency interpretations contained 
within certain legally nonbinding instruments, in particular legal briefs 
and, at least potentially, certain non-legislative rules. Because the non-
authoritative interpretations contained in such instruments most often 
constitute the best available evidence concerning what an agency would 
do if it were to speak authoritatively, courts will rarely have epistemic 
justification to predict a change in interpretive course. This conclusion 
is surprising in part because of the way it interacts with the central 
holding of United States v. Mead Corp.11 that the interpretations 
contained in such instruments are not to receive deference under 
Chevron.12 What this Article will suggest is that the central holding of 
Mead ought to be regarded as mostly moot since, even where deference 
is not owed de jure, it is more often than not owed de facto. 
In arguing for the near mootness of Mead, this Article will draw 
upon the symmetry between the role of federal courts with respect to 
questions of administrative and state law, respectively.13 As the Supreme 
Court observed in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand 
X Internet Services,14 federal courts occupy a subordinate role in the 
administrative and the state law context alike.15 In the state law context, 
where highest state courts retain primary interpretive authority, federal 
courts adhere to a set of practices calibrated to ensure maximum fidelity 
to those highest state courts, subject to fairness and resource constraints. 
First and most straightforward, where the relevant state’s highest court 
has spoken authoritatively on some question of state law, federal courts 
will act in accordance with that state court’s ruling, regardless of any 
prior, conflicting rulings either on the part of that state court or any 
federal court.16 Second, where the relevant state’s highest court has yet 
to speak on some unsettled question of state law, federal courts will, 
where practicable, provide that state court the opportunity to do so.17 
While in the past state courts relied upon various abstention doctrines 
to provide this opportunity, more recently, certification—along with its 
 
 11 533 U.S. 218, 229–33 (2001). 
 12 See id.; accord Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such 
as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, 
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style 
deference.”). 
 13 Within legal scholarship, this symmetry has been explored most thoroughly by Kenneth 
Bamberger and Kathryn Watts. See Bamberger, supra note 9; Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to 
Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997 (2007). 
 14 545 U.S. 967. 
 15 See id. at 983–84 (drawing analogy between federal courts’ respective role in the two 
contexts). 
 16 See infra Part I.A. 
 17 See infra Part II.A.1. 
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perceived lower attendant costs—has come to be the preferred device.18 
Third and final, where impracticable to provide that opportunity to 
speak, rather than exercising independent judgment, federal courts 
confronted with an unsettled question of state law will limit themselves 
to predicting how the relevant state’s highest court would rule.19 
As this Article will discuss, federal court practice in the 
administrative law context largely mirrors that in the state law context—
with one significant exception. As in the state law context, federal courts 
will defer to the primary interpreter—here, administering agencies—
when that interpreter speaks authoritatively on an interpretive 
question.20 Likewise, as in the state law context, federal courts will, 
through adherence to the rule on remand and application of the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine, provide the relevant interpretive 
authority the opportunity to speak on a question of interpretation that it 
has yet to address where it would be practicable to do so.21 Where 
administrative and state law practice diverge, however, and where, this 
Article will argue, federal courts deviate from their role as subordinate, 
is in circumstances where providing that opportunity to speak is 
impracticable. As mentioned above, rather than limiting themselves to 
prediction, courts in such circumstances exercise independent judgment 
in answering the interpretive questions before them.22 In so doing, 
courts substitute what they deem good policymaking for fidelity to rule, 
bringing about in turn the various costs that result from having 
competing rather than cooperative interpretive bodies. These adverse 
consequences are all the greater as a result of a significant asymmetry 
between the administrative and the state law context, with the 
asymmetry being that, unlike in the state law context, where evidence is 
often sparse concerning how a given state court would proceed, in the 
administrative law context, evidence of what a given administering 
agency would do is readily available in the form of interpretations 
contained in nonbinding instruments, in particular legal briefs.23 As a 
result, whereas the difference between prediction and the exercise of 
independent judgment is plausibly insubstantial in a number of state 
law cases, the difference between the two in administrative law contexts 
is inarguably significant. Ironically, then, although the administrative 
law context is the one in which it is possible to predict with significant 
accuracy, it is the context in which federal courts abandon the approach. 
 
 18 See id. 
 19 See infra Part II.B.1. 
 20 See infra Part I.B. 
 21 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 22 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 23 See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
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 This Article will consist of two parts. In Part I, it will articulate 
the rationales for regarding federal courts as subordinates within the 
state and the administrative law context, respectively. In so doing, it will 
discuss the, at this point, uncontroversial practice whereby federal 
courts defer to the official determinations of state courts and agencies 
within their respective domains of authority. In Part II, it will discuss 
the ways in which subordinate federal courts behave in the absence of 
such authoritative pronouncements. First it will outline the parallels 
between the various abstention doctrines and certification in the state 
law context and remand and primary jurisdiction in the administrative 
law context as methods to provide the relevant authority the 
opportunity to speak authoritatively on a particular matter when it has 
yet to do so. Second, it will discuss the asymmetry between the behavior 
of federal courts in the administrative and the state law contexts when 
providing that opportunity to speak would be impracticable, observing 
that whereas federal courts limit themselves to predicting how the 
relevant authority would rule in the state law context, said courts permit 
themselves to exercise independent judgment in the administrative law 
context, thereby engaging in insubordination. 
I.     PRIMARY INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY AND PROVISIONAL PRECEDENT 
As the Supreme Court observed in Brand X, federal courts operate 
as subordinates in the state and the administrative law contexts alike. In 
that case, the Court was presented with the question of whether federal 
courts owe deference to an interpretation of an unclear regulatory 
statute by an administering agency even where prior, conflicting judicial 
interpretations exist. Over a vociferous dissent from Justice Scalia, who 
deemed both “bizarre” and “probably unconstitutional” the prospect of 
agencies “revers[ing] or ignor[ing]” judicial determinations not to their 
liking,24 the Court ruled that deference was owed even in these 
circumstances.25 In response to Justice Scalia’s objections, the Court 
observed that, just as there is nothing “bizarre” about the prospect of a 
ruling by a state’s highest court taking precedence over an earlier, 
conflicting federal court determination in a matter of state law, neither 
should there be anything unsettling about the prospect of an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it administers—at least where unclear—
supplanting an earlier judicial one.26 As the Court observed, because in 
both contexts the primary interpretive authority rests not with the 
 
 24 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1017 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 25 Id. at 985. 
 26 Id. at 983–84. 
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federal judiciary but, instead, with some other decision-maker, 
determinations by the federal judiciary in either context are correctly 
understood as provisional, with the state court or agency, respectively, 
retaining the authority to shape the law in the way that it sees fit.27 
That federal courts operate as subordinates in both the state and 
the administrative law context is thought to follow from a core 
constitutional value in each case. In the context of state law, the 
constitutional value in question is federalism.28 In the administrative law 
context, it is the separation of powers.29 Whatever the constitutional 
basis, insofar as one concedes that federal courts operate as subordinates 
in each context, one is committed straightaway to the conclusion that 
any determinations issued by those courts are provisional, to be 
supplanted if and when the relevant decision-maker speaks in its 
authoritative capacity.30 
A.     State Courts 
That state courts retain primary interpretive authority with respect 
to questions of state law is a familiar principle, one that, in the words of 
Justice Ginsburg, “reflects the core of federalism.”31 While a federal 
court may be routinely asked to apply state law in order to resolve cases 
properly before it on the basis of, for example, diversity jurisdiction, 
such a court is to refrain from declaring state law out of respect for our 
 
 27 Id.; accord Bamberger, supra note 9, at 1310–15 (outlining theory of “provisional 
precedent” for administrative law context modeled federal court handling of unsettled questions 
of state law). 
 28 See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 723 (1996) (“Federal courts abstain 
out of deference to the paramount interests of another sovereign, and the concern is with 
principles of comity and federalism.” (citations omitted)); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–75 
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (characterizing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 
“as one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch 
the allocation of judicial power between the state and federal systems”). 
 29 See, e.g., Legal Authority of the Department of the Treasury to Issue Regulations Indexing 
Capital Gains for Inflation, 16 Op. O.L.C. 136, 139 n.5 (1992) (“Chevron . . . sounds in the 
separation of powers under the Constitution and thus is an important limitation on judicial 
power.” (citation omitted)); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994 (3d ed. 
2000) (remarking that Chevron deference is “premised on important separation-of-powers 
principles”).  
 30 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 778 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (recognizing that, since “the Colorado Supreme Court is the ultimate authority on the 
meaning of Colorado law,” Supreme Court’s state law determination is necessarily “provisional”); 
Watts, supra note 13, at 1015 (“[B]y delegating interpretive authority to an agency, Congress 
intends the agency to act as the ‘authoritative interpreter’ of ambiguity in the statute. If an agency 
fails to exercise its congressionally-delegated interpretive powers, the courts remain free to 
impose their own interpretation in the interim. But if the agency later elects to exercise its 
congressionally-delegated powers to select a contrary construction, Chevron commands that the 
courts apply the agency’s construction, so long as it is reasonable.” (footnote omitted)). 
 31 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 142 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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system of dual sovereignty.32 Put simply, as to questions of state law, 
state courts are “the only tribunal[s] empowered to speak definitively.”33 
As this Article will discuss below, the task of applying while refraining 
from declaring state law becomes somewhat complicated when a federal 
court is presented with a question of state law to which existing state 
court precedent provides no clear answer.34 However, when state courts 
have spoken clearly, the duty of federal courts is straightforward: federal 
courts must, barring exceptional circumstances, defer to the state court 
interpretation.35 This remains true even where conflicting federal 
precedent exists with respect to the state law question at issue.36 Federal 
courts must regard any prior, conflicting federal precedent as having 
been merely “provisional” in character.37 To do otherwise would, after 
all, be to “declare” state law,38 thereby usurping the state court’s 
legitimate interpretive authority, upsetting in turn our system of 
“cooperative judicial federalism.”39 
B.     Agencies 
That agencies retain primary interpretive authority with respect to 
unclear terms or provisions within the statutes that they administer is, at 
this point, a familiar principle as well.40 In Chevron, the Supreme Court 
first held that courts are to defer to an agency interpretation of such a 
term or provision, subject to the condition that an agency’s 
 
 32 See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial 
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1461 (1997) (“Erie’s dual command—that federal 
courts apply but not declare state law . . . .” (emphases added)). 
 33 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959). 
 34 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 35–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 35 See, e.g., Kokins v. Teleflex, Inc., 621 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2010) (“To properly discern 
the content of state law, [the Court of Appeals] ‘must defer to the most recent decisions of the 
state’s highest court.’” (quoting Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 
2003))); Bueno v. Hallahan, 988 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curium) (observing that a federal 
court “must defer to the state court’s interpretation of state law” (citation omitted)). 
 36 See, e.g., Wankier, 353 F.3d at 866 (“[W]hen a panel of this Court has rendered a decision 
interpreting state law, that interpretation is binding on district courts in this circuit, and on 
subsequent panels of this Court, unless an intervening decision of the state’s highest court has 
resolved the issue.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 
1273–74 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The very nature of diversity jurisdiction leaves open the possibility that a 
state court will subsequently disagree with a federal court’s interpretation of state law.”). 
 37 Bamberger, supra note 9, at 1308 (“[O]nce a state exercises its primary authority to make 
such a decision or amendment, the federal interpretation is no longer binding. Its precedential 
value is, literally, provisional.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
 38 Erie R.R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 39 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391(1974). 
 40 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (characterizing Chevron as “the most 
cited case in modern public law”). 
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interpretation falls within the bounds of reasonability.41 As the Court 
reasoned, “if the [agency administered] statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to [a] specific issue,”42 that silence or ambiguity is best 
interpreted as an “implicit”43 delegation by Congress to the relevant 
agency to “fill any gap” created thereby.44 Thus, if confronted with an 
ambiguous provision within an agency-administered statute, “a court 
may not substitute its own [interpretation] of [the] statutory provision 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.”45 
At least on its face, this imputation to Congress of a blanket intent 
to delegate might seem plainly incompatible with the Congress’s explicit 
instruction that courts “decide all relevant questions of law, [and] 
interpret . . . statutory provisions”46 when confronted with an agency-
administered statute.47 More fundamentally, one might think that 
adopting a general practice of deferring to agency interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory terms constitutes a dramatic abdication by the 
judiciary of its basic “duty,” assigning to agencies the paradigmatically 
judicial task of stating the law.48 However, as Justice Scalia has observed, 
one need see no abdication here: 
An ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implementation can 
be attributed to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress 
intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) 
Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave 
its resolution to the agency. When the former is the case, what we 
have is genuinely a question of law, properly to be resolved by the 
 
 41 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–45 (1984). 
 42 Id. at 843. 
 43 Id. at 844. 
 44 Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
 45 Id. at 844 (emphasis added). 
 46 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”). 
 47 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–42 n.2 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(observing that the language of § 706 “would seem to mean that all statutory ambiguities are to be 
resolved judicially” (citation omitted)); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2637, 2640 (2003) (“Arguably, Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act is a broad 
statement delegating that authority to courts, contrary to the rule adopted in Chevron.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 48 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2074–
75 (1990) (characterizing Chevron as a “counter-Marbury, for the administrative state”); see also 
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 436 
(1995) (“Always, there has been strong authority for what we could call the Marbury view of 
administrative law . . . . Under this view, no deference in interpretation is called for: Interpretation 
is just lawfinding, and courts rather than bureaucrats are given the power to find federal law.”); 
Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (1986) 
(“[T]he executive branch . . . is displacing the judiciary in its traditional and jealously guarded 
law-declaring function.” (footnote omitted)). 
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courts. When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of 
discretion upon the agency, and the only question of law presented to 
the courts is whether the agency has acted within the scope of its 
discretion—i.e., whether its resolution of the ambiguity is 
reasonable.49 
According to Justice Scalia, then, insofar as unclarity within an 
agency-administered statute is best understood as a “conferral of 
discretion upon the agency,”50 the resolution of such unclarity is not, as 
in the ordinary case, an act of interpretation, i.e., one of attempting to 
discern the meaning of the term or provision that Congress intended, 
but, rather, an act of policy making, i.e., one of deciding what the 
meaning of the unclear term or provision shall be.51 Unconstrained by 
the norm of interpretive fidelity52—again, there is, by stipulation, no 
congressionally intended meaning to which an agency could be 
faithful53—the “interpreting” agency is thus free, subject to the 
constraint of textual fit, to adopt whatever interpretation it believes, in 
light of present knowledge and circumstances,54 will best advance its 
 
 49 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 516 (emphases added). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 52 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
5 (2001) (“In our constitutional system, it is widely assumed that federal judges must act as 
Congress’s faithful agents.” (footnote omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent 
conception of the role of courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the 
legislature. . . . The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by others, most notably 
the legislature.” (footnote omitted)). 
 53 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (holding 
deference appropriate because “Congress did not have a specific intention” as to the meaning of 
the relevant term); see also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An 
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1024 (“After Chevron, it no 
longer makes sense to speak . . . of a statute administered by an agency as having a single ‘most 
natural or logical’ meaning.”). 
 54 With an emphasis placed upon “present.” See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“[T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave the 
discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency. An initial 
agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency . . . must 
consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis, for example, 
in response to changed factual circumstances, or a change in administrations . . . .” (first alteration 
in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–
64)); Scalia, supra note 49, at 517 (“[T]here is no longer any justification for giving ‘special’ 
deference to ‘long-standing and consistent’ agency interpretations of law. That venerable 
principle made a lot of sense when we assumed that both court and agency were searching for the 
one, permanent, ‘correct’ meaning of the statute; it makes no sense when we acknowledge that the 
agency is free to give the statute whichever of several possible meanings it thinks most conducive 
to accomplishment of the statutory purpose.”). The Court’s remarks in Brand X notwithstanding, 
it remains at least somewhat controversial whether a mere “change in administration” constitutes 
a sufficient basis for a change in an agency’s interpretation. Compare, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“A change in administration brought about by the people casting their 
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overall policy agenda.55 As a result, when a court defers to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of an unclear statutory term or provision, far 
from abdicating its duty to “say what the law is,”56 that court is, in 
compliance with Congress’s intent,57 appropriately ceding to the 
technically expert and politically accountable agency58 the mixed, 
decidedly non-judicial task of declaring what the law shall be and 
determining how best to carry that law into effect. The only task left to 
the judiciary, then, is that of determining the “scope of [the agency’s] 
discretion,”59 i.e., the bounds of the “policy space”60 within which an 
agency may exercise its judgment.61 
 
votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits 
of its programs and regulations.”), with FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 552 
(2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where does, and why would, the APA grant agencies the freedom 
to change major policies on the basis of nothing more than political considerations . . . ?”). The 
extent to which the Court’s 2009 decision Fox settles the matter remains uncertain. E.g., Fox 
Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515 (“[An agency] need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction 
that the reasons for [a] new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the 
new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency 
believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.”). See Randy J. 
Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 129 (2011) (“A 
majority in Fox refused to subject an administrative reversal to heightened scrutiny, but a 
different coalition of five Justices indicated that at least some agency reversals require more 
rigorous review.”). 
 55 See Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and 
Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5 (“[S]tandard principles of administrative law so as to permit the 
executive to interpret ambiguous provisions as he sees fit, so long as his interpretation is 
reasonable.”). 
 56 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 57 See Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 17, 
21 (1985) (“Sometimes the most faithful reading of a statute is that the legislature intended to 
make no decision on a particular substantive issue and to leave that issue to administrative 
creativity. In such a situation, a court’s refusal to use independent judgment actually fulfills 
Congress’ intent.” (footnote omitted)). 
 58 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (contrasting judges, who “are not experts in the field, and are 
not part of either political branch of the Government,” with agencies, who possess “great 
expertise” and are part of the politically accountable Executive Branch). As Randolph May argues, 
the political accountability rationale of Chevron plausibly applies with less force to independent 
agencies than to ordinary executive agencies. See Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: 
Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 448 (2006) (“[F]or 
independent agencies, the political accountability link to the President emphasized in Chevron is 
absent.”). But see Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 523 (plurality) (“The independent agencies 
are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that their 
freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased 
subservience to congressional direction.” (citations omitted)). Whatever the force of Mr. May’s 
argument, it is surely the case that even independent agencies are held to a greater degree of 
political accountability than is a federal judiciary with salary protection and life tenure. See U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 59 Scalia, supra note 49, at 516. 
 60 E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of 
Congress, Courts and Agencies in Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2005) (“Post-
Chevron, statutes no longer possess a single prescriptive meaning on many questions; rather, they 
describe what I call a ‘policy space,’ a range of permissible interpretive discretion, within which a 
variety of decisions that the agency might make would be legally defensible to varying degrees.”); 
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Whether operating within a policy space is best understood as a 
legislative activity, an executive activity, or some combination of the 
two,62 what is relevant for present purposes is that, according to the 
rationale of Chevron, the resolution of unclarity within agency-
administered statutes—as opposed to statutes more generally63—is best 
understood as something other than the quintessentially judicial activity 
of “say[ing] what the law is.”64 As a result, rather than a shirking of its 
judicial duty, the adoption of the practice of deferring to agency 
interpretation in this context can thus be characterized as a good faith 
attempt by the Court to comply with the negative implication of the 
famed Marbury pronouncement, namely that courts do best to refrain 
 
see also, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 597, 601 (2009) (arguing that a court’s role is merely to determine a “statute’s “zone of 
ambiguity,” the set of interpretations which the statute does not clearly prohibit”); Peter L. 
Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (arguing that a court’s role is merely to determine a 
statute’s “‘Chevron space,’” i.e., “the area within which an administrative agency has been 
statutorily empowered to act in a manner that creates legal obligations or constraints—that is, its 
delegated or allocated authority”). 
 61 See, e.g., Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 60, at 601 (“If [an] agency promulgates an 
interpretation within [the identified] zone . . . then under Chevron the reviewing court must 
uphold the agency’s interpretation, even though it differs from the court’s most-preferred 
construction . . . .”); Strauss, supra note 60, at 1145 (“Faced with the exercise of such authority, the 
natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports match, is to see that the ball stays within the 
bounds of the playing field and that the game is played according to its rules. It is not for courts 
themselves to play the game. From a finding of law that Congress has validly allocated authority 
to a noncourt body, it follows ineluctably that that other body has the authority to decide the 
issues allocated to it, subject to such judicial supervision as oversight entails.”). 
 62 Compare, e.g., Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (characterizing an agency’s “adoption of a [legislative] rule [a]s an exercise of the 
executive rather than the legislative power”), with Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 
628 (1935) (referring to agency activity as “quasi legislative” in character). 
 63 While some argue that “Chevron is best taken as a vindication of the realist claim that 
resolution of statutory ambiguities often calls for judgments of policy and principle,” Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 
2610 (2006); see also Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, 
J.) (characterizing Chevron as “in effect equating statutory interpretation to policymaking” 
(citation omitted)), courts continue to regard fidelity the governing norm when interpreting the 
ordinary statute. See infra notes 64, 154 and accompanying text. 
 64 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). In other words, something other 
than discerning the “best,” in the sense of the most faithful, interpretation of a given legal text. See 
generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (discussing the 
norm of interpretive fidelity generally). The contrast is, in this context, most often brought to the 
fore in discussions of the (ir)relevance of consistency of an agency’s interpretation to the question 
of whether that interpretation warrants deference. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 
(2002) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not believe, to begin with, that particular deference is owed to 
an agency interpretation of longstanding duration. That notion is an anachronism—a relic of the 
pre-Chevron days, when there was thought to be only one ‘correct’ interpretation of a statutory 
text. A ‘longstanding’ agency interpretation, particularly one that dated back to the very origins of 
the statute, was more likely to reflect the single correct meaning. But once it is accepted, as it was 
in Chevron, that there is a range of permissible interpretations, and that the agency is free to move 
from one to another, so long as the most recent interpretation is reasonable its antiquity should 
make no difference.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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from engaging non-judicial activities where possible,65 in particular 
where Congress has specifically intended—albeit implicitly and, indeed, 
fictionally66—that courts leave such activities to another decision-
maker.67 
Once one understands the interpretation of an unclear term or 
provision within an agency-administered statute as a policymaking task, 
a policymaking task delegated by Congress not to the judiciary but to 
the administering agency, the Court’s holding in Brand X that a federal 
court must defer to a reasonable agency interpretation of some such 
term or provision notwithstanding any prior, conflicting judicial 
interpretation becomes straightforward enough. Just as a federal court 
lacks the authority to declare state law, so too does it lack the authority 
to declare federal law where Congress has specifically assigned that 
authority to another decision-maker. Under these circumstances, a 
court’s insistence that its own prior, conflicting decision ought to take 
precedent over a later decision by the congressionally designated 
decision-maker would fly in the face of the separation of powers twice-
over, conflicting first with the general presumption that courts are to 
refrain from acts of policymaking where possible and second with 
Congress’s authority to allocate decision-making authority where it sees 
fit. 
 
 65 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) 
(“The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle 
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: ‘Our Constitution vests such 
responsibilities in the political branches.’” (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978))); 
Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—the Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 
822 (1990) (“[U]ndeniably whether one is examining the Constitution or legislation, with respect 
to a given case, one often encounters ambiguities. Chevron’s rule . . . is simply a sound recognition 
that a political branch, the executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than the 
judiciary.” (footnote omitted)); Note, Justifying the Chevron Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of 
Lenity, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2043, 2045 (2010) (“Chevron deference is best understood as 
maintaining the traditional constitutional balance in which policy discretion is kept out of the 
hands of the politically unaccountable judiciary . . . .”); cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION § 6.1, at 380 (6th ed. 2012) (recognizing “strong presumption against the federal 
courts fashioning common law to decide cases”). 
 66 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363, 370 (1986) (recognizing fictional nature of Chevron’s presumption concerning congressional 
intent); Scalia, supra note 49, at 517 (same). 
 67 See Manning, supra note 6, at 626–27 (“Chevron adopts a background presumption 
[concerning congressional intent] that reconciles now firmly established conceptions of 
delegation with constitutional structure. It is more consistent with the assumptions of our 
constitutional system to vest discretion in more expert, representative, and accountable 
administrative agencies.”). 
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II.     ACTING IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION 
As mentioned above, federal courts have long recognized in the 
state law context that, where a court occupies a subordinate role in an 
interpretive hierarchy, its subordinate status ought to shape not only the 
way that court behaves when its interpretive authority has acted, but 
also when that authority has yet to do so. When presented with a 
question of state law to which existing state court precedent provides no 
clear answer, a federal court will behave in recognition of its subordinate 
status in one of two ways: First, where practicable, a federal court will 
attempt, either through abstention68 or certification,69 to provide the 
relevant state court with the opportunity to speak directly and 
authoritatively on the state law question at issue. Second, where 
abstention or certification is impracticable, a federal court will attempt 
to minimize the likelihood of a conflict with a later, authoritative state 
court ruling by limiting itself to predicting how the relevant state court 
would decide the matter.70 By adhering to this dual approach of 
abstention/certification and prediction, a federal court not only fosters 
comity with the authoritative state court by deferring to that court’s 
judgment where practicable, but also increases fairness to individual 
litigants by minimizing the likelihood of inconsistent applications of 
state law across cases. 
By contrast, federal courts have taken their subordinate status into 
account only partially when presented with a question of interpretation 
concerning an ambiguous term or provision within an agency-
administered statute absent an authoritative interpretation by the 
administering agency. Federal courts have, in this context, substantially 
replicated the state law practice of abstention by adhering to the rule on 
remand by which a court will remand to an agency adjudicatory body in 
order to provide it the opportunity to address authoritatively an open 
interpretive question,71 and to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 
 
 68 See, e.g., Johnson v. Collins Entm’t Co., 199 F.3d 710, 720 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding 
abstention required in case involving disputed questions of state gaming law); Catlin v. Ambach, 
820 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding abstention required in case involving interpretation of 
state education law). 
 69 See, e.g., Nunez v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir. 2012) (certifying 
to Florida Supreme Court question concerning interpretation of Florida insurance statute); 
Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 607 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2010) (certifying to California 
Supreme Court question of California constitutional law). 
 70 See, e.g., Jaworowski v. Ciasulli, 490 F.3d 331, 335 (3d Cir. 2007) (predicting how New 
Jersey Supreme Court would interpret New Jersey statute of limitations for personal injury 
actions); DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 111–15 (2d Cir. 2005) (predicting how New York 
Court of Appeals would interpret New York libel law). 
 71 See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (holding that remand to Board of 
Immigration appropriate, barring exceptional circumstances, where the Board “has not yet 
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question”). 
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pursuant to which a federal court may dismiss or stay a case in order to 
provide the relevant agency to consider directly the case before the court 
or a specific issue contained therein.72 At the same time, federal courts—
in combination with Congress and the various regulatory agencies—
have failed to replicate in the administrative law context the more 
efficient state law practice of certification, thereby providing agencies 
less of an opportunity (at least in this one respect) to speak directly and 
authoritatively to unanswered interpretive questions within their 
purview than is provided to their state court counterparts. Much more 
problematically, federal courts have failed (almost) entirely to replicate 
in the administrative law context the state law practice of limiting 
themselves to predicting how the relevant agency would answer a given 
interpretive question when there is no opportunity to allow the agency 
to speak directly and authoritatively to the matter. Instead, federal 
courts have preferred to exercise their own judgment when answering 
such questions, taking into account (readily available) signals 
concerning the relevant agency’s preferred interpretation only where the 
court deems the content of those signals to be persuasive,73 i.e., as 
indicating to the court that the agency’s preferred interpretation is the 
“correct” one.74 While federal courts have plausibly adhered to the 
independent judgment approach in an effort to give effect to the 
Supreme Court’s instruction in Mead not to accord full Chevron 
deference to agency interpretation contained within instruments lacking 
“the force of law,”75 the end result has been not only the aggrandizement 
of federal courts at the expense of their interpretive superiors, but also 
the bringing about of unfairness to individual litigants as a result of an 
 
 72 See, e.g., In re StarNet, Inc., 355 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Instead of 
trying to divine how the FCC would resolve the ambiguity created by the word “location,” we 
think it best to send this matter to the Commission under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.”); 
Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 782 (9th Cir. 2002) (referring to 
Register of Copyright’s challenge to validity of copyright registration pursuant to doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction). 
 73 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134 (1944)). 
 74 Campesinos Unidos, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 803 F.2d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“Although not binding on this court, the Secretary’s interpretation of his own regulation is 
entitled to some deference, and here we believe that interpretation to be correct.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA., 292 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reasoning 
that, where Chevron framework inapplicable, “better” interpretation prevails); Kristin E. Hickman 
& Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 
1256 (2007) (acknowledging that “most of the Court’s post-Mead applications of Skidmore review 
reflect the independent judgment model”); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency 
Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1015 (2005) (“[Mead] basically instructs 
courts to exercise independent judgment regarding statutory meaning subject to the weak 
requirement that they carefully consider agency views for persuasiveness [where Chevron does not 
apply].” (footnote omitted)). 
 75 Mead, 533 U.S. at 221; accord Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 (2000). 
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increase in the likelihood of inconsistent application of regulatory 
statutes across cases. 
A.     Abstention/Certification and Remand/Primary Jurisdiction 
One obvious way of avoiding conflict with one’s interpretive 
superior is for one to provide that superior the opportunity to address 
directly as many questions as possible. In the state law context, federal 
courts have historically adhered to a number of related abstention 
doctrines, pursuant to which such a court will, under certain 
circumstances, dismiss or stay a case involving an unsettled question of 
state law in order to compel the plaintiff in the case to bring a separate 
suit in the relevant state court, thereby presenting that court with the 
opportunity to address the unsettled question of state law directly. 
Because of the attendant costs of requiring a plaintiff to bring an entirely 
separate suit, federal courts have, in recent years, come to rely 
increasingly on certification, a process by which a federal court will 
request of the relevant state’s highest court that it address, through a 
more focused proceeding, the specific unsettled question of state law 
that the federal court finds itself confronted with. 
In the administrative law context, federal courts largely mirror the 
state law practice of abstention through adherence to the rule on 
remand and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
federal courts, in conjunction with both regulatory agencies and 
Congress, have thus far failed to adopt a regulatory analogue of 
certification. Because certification would be no more efficient than 
abstention in soliciting an agency interpretation through notice-and-
comment rulemaking, the practical significance of the absence of 
regulatory certification is minimal. At the same time, because 
certification would provide an efficiency advantage over soliciting an 
agency interpretation through formal adjudication, courts, in 
conjunction with agencies or Congress, would do best to provide for 
and to adopt such a practice. 
1.     Abstention/Certification 
When confronted with an unsettled interpretive question, perhaps 
the surest way for a subordinate federal court to avoid an eventual 
conflict with the relevant interpretive authority is to provide that 
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authority with an opportunity to speak first on the matter.76 In the state 
law context, a federal court confronted with an unsettled question of 
state law will, under the appropriate circumstances, provide the relevant 
state court with the opportunity to address that question in one of two 
ways. First, a federal court might abstain from deciding the case before 
it,77 requiring that the plaintiff in the case to bring a separate suit in the 
relevant state court, thereby providing that state court with the 
opportunity to answer any state law questions arising in the case.78 
Second, a federal court might certify the specific state law question it 
regards as unsettled to the relevant state’s highest court,79 thereby 
providing that court with the opportunity to rule specifically on that 
question before proceeding, if necessary, with the remainder of the case. 
Both abstention and certification reflect a commitment by the 
federal judiciary to a system of “cooperative judicial federalism.”80 More 
specifically, what those practices reflect is the commitment by that 
judiciary to the position that, as to questions of state law, state courts are 
the only decision-makers “equipped to rule authoritatively.”81 Given 
that commitment, federal courts regard any rulings where they might 
issue concerning unsettled questions of state law that later come into 
conflict with authoritative state court rulings as having been made in 
“error,” error that can be avoided through abstention or certification.82 
More significantly, recognizing that later conflicting state court rulings 
will, in light of their authoritative status, bind future litigants, federal 
courts rely on abstention and, more recently, certification as means of 
 
 76 See World Harvest Church, Inc. v. Guideone Mut. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 950, 952 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“The only way we can be sure that the state law questions that underlie those three issues 
are answered correctly is to certify them to the [state’s highest court].” (citation omitted)). 
 77 Whether a stay by the federal court or a dismissal (with or without prejudice) is appropriate 
will depend upon the abstention doctrine being invoked. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, § 12.3, 
at 836 (contrasting so-called Pullman abstention (federal constitutional avoidance), which 
normally requires the federal court to stay its proceedings pending the determination of the state 
court proceeding, with so-called Burford abstention (interference with complex state regulatory 
regime), which requires dismissal with prejudice). 
 78 Assuming it retained jurisdiction, the federal court would, at that point, take up any 
remaining federal questions. See England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 
(1964) (holding claimant, following state court ruling, entitled to return to federal district court 
for adjudication of any remaining federal questions). 
 79 At present forty-five states as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico have 
adopted certification procedures. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4248, n.30 (3d ed. 2004). 
 80 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). 
 81 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75–76 (1997); see also, e.g., La. Power 
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (observing that Louisiana state court as 
“the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively” on unsettled question of Louisiana state law); 
R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–500 (1941) (observing that federal court’s 
answer to an unsettled question of Texas state law “cannot escape being a forecast rather than a 
determination” because “[t]he last word on the meaning of [that law] . . . belongs neither to [the 
U.S. Supreme Court] nor to the district court but to the supreme court of Texas”). 
 82 Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 79. 
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ensuring consistent treatment—and in turn fairness—for individual 
litigants.83 
Because of the attendant costs to litigants, both in terms of time 
and money, the Supreme Court has been reasonably hesitant to 
recommend that federal courts resort to abstention as a way of 
minimizing conflict with their state court superiors.84 This hesitancy has 
plausibly been enhanced by the concern that a federal court runs afoul 
of the separation of powers when it refuses to hear a case properly 
before it pursuant to a congressional grant of jurisdiction.85 As a result, 
current Supreme Court doctrine calls for abstention only in 
“exceptional circumstances”86 where certain interests in addition to 
cooperative judicial federalism would be advanced.87 And even then, the 
Court instructs that abstention is appropriate only where the attendant 
costs to litigants would not be undue.88 
 
 83 See, e.g., Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 30 (“The consequence of [permitting a federal court to 
interpret a previously uninterpreted Louisiana statute] would be that this case would be the only 
case in which the Louisiana statute is construed as we would construe it, whereas the rights of all 
other litigants would be thereafter governed by a decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
quite different from ours.”); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500 (“In this situation a federal court of equity is 
asked to decide an issue by making a tentative answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a 
state adjudication. The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court 
is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court.” (citations omitted)). 
 84 See Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 76 (“Attractive in theory because it placed 
state-law questions in courts equipped to rule authoritatively on them, Pullman abstention proved 
protracted and expensive in practice . . . .”). 
 85 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We have no more right to 
decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one 
or the other would be treason to the constitution.”); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of 
Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984) (arguing that various 
abstention doctrines “could be characterized as a judicial usurpation of legislative authority, in 
violation of the principle of separation of powers”). But see David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (1985) (arguing that “the continued existence of measured 
authority to decline jurisdiction does not endanger, but rather protects, the principle of separation 
of powers” since “the question whether a court must exercise jurisdiction and resolve a 
controversy on its merits is difficult, if not impossible, to answer in gross” and “the courts are 
functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning than is the legislature”). 
 86 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976). 
 87 See, e.g., Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28 (abstention appropriate where uncertain state statute 
“intimately involved with sovereign prerogative”); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333–34 
(1943) (abstention appropriate where federal court ruling would unduly interfere with complex 
state regulatory scheme); Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500–01 (abstention appropriate where resolution of 
state law issue could render unnecessary the resolution of a federal constitutional issue). 
 88 See, e.g., Harris Cnty. Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975) (“We have 
repeatedly warned, however, that because of the delays inherent in the abstention process and the 
danger that valuable federal rights might be lost in the absence of expeditious adjudication in the 
federal court, abstention must be invoked only in ‘special circumstances,’ and only upon careful 
consideration of the facts of each case.” (citations omitted)); Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 
406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972) (recognizing that abstention appropriate only in “narrowly limited 
special circumstances justifying ‘the delay and expense to which application of the abstention 
doctrine inevitably gives rise.’” (citations omitted) (quoting England v. La. State Bd. Med. 
Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 418 (1964))). 
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The outlook is somewhat rosier with respect to certification. 
Because it is at least perceived by the Court to have lower attendant 
costs to litigants as contrasted with abstention,89 and because it less 
obviously conflicts with any duty a federal court might have to hear any 
and all cases properly before it,90 the Supreme Court has been notably 
more sanguine with respect to certification as a tool for fostering comity 
between state and federal courts.91 The Court expressed its friendliness 
towards certification most clearly in Arizonans for Official English v. 
Arizona,92 where it indicated not only that certification had come to 
supplant abstention as the preferred method of providing a state court 
the opportunity to address directly an unsettled question of state law,93 
but also that, because of certification’s practical advantages vis-à-vis 
abstention, resort to certification is not limited to the same “unique 
circumstances” as is—or, perhaps, was—resort to abstention.94 As to the 
latter observation, the Court went so far as to suggest that the mere 
presence of a “[n]ovel, unsettled question[] of state law” might be 
enough to render certification appropriate in a given case.95 
2.     Remand/Primary Jurisdiction 
At least with respect to abstention, federal court practice in the 
administrative law context largely mirrors that in the state law context. 
First, in the adjudicatory context, courts adhere to the remand rule by 
 
 89 E.g., Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 79 (“[Certification] procedures do not entail 
the delays, expense, and procedural complexity that generally attend abstention decisions.”); City 
of Hous., Tex. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 470 (1987) (“The certification procedure is useful in reducing 
the substantial burdens of cost and delay that abstention places on litigants.”). 
 90 See Clark, supra note 32, at 1550–51 (“[C]ertification would alleviate the separation-of-
powers concerns associated with abstention by preventing federal courts from ‘declin[ing] the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given’ by Congress. . . . Federal courts remain free to undertake 
necessary fact identification both before and after certification, and to apply relevant principles of 
state law to the facts once the highest state court has supplied the necessary rules of decision.” 
(quoting Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406)). 
 91 Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (“State certification procedures are a very 
desirable means by which a federal court may ascertain an undecided point of state law, especially 
where . . . the question can be certified directly to the court of last resort within the State.”); see 
also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976) (“Although we do not mean to intimate that 
abstention would be improper in this case were certification not possible, the availability of 
certification greatly simplifies the analysis.”). 
 92 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
 93 E.g., id. at 75 (“Certification today covers territory once dominated by a deferral device 
called ‘Pullman abstention . . . .’”). 
 94 Id. at 79 (“Blending abstention with certification, the Ninth Circuit found ‘no unique 
circumstances in this case militating in favor of certification.’ Novel, unsettled questions of state 
law, however, not ‘unique circumstances,’ are necessary before federal courts may avail 
themselves of state certification procedures.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Yniguez v. Arizonans 
for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 1995))). 
 95 Id. 
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which a court will remand to an agency adjudicatory body in 
circumstances where that body failed to address authoritatively a 
potentially dispositive interpretive question in its initial ruling.96 In the 
words of the Court, “This remand rule exists, in part, because 
‘ambiguities in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are 
delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in 
reasonable fashion. Filling these gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices 
that agencies are better equipped to make than courts.’”97 
Second, pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a federal 
court may, under certain circumstances, abstain from deciding a case 
before it, requiring the litigants to seek administrative resolution either 
of the entire dispute or of some particular issue.98 As with the various 
abstention doctrines in the state law context, primary jurisdiction is a 
doctrine that federal courts are expected to invoke selectively.99 
Although “[n]o fixed formula exists” concerning when to apply the 
doctrine,100 courts are expected to take into account a variety of 
considerations, including the importance of ensuring uniform 
resolution of the regulatory issue in question,101 the extent to which the 
resolution of that issue would benefit from agency expertise,102 and the 
 
 96 See Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative 
Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 
171 (2012) (noting that the remand rule renders “[t]he analogy [drawn by the Court in Brand X] 
between federal courts construing state law and federal statutes administered by agencies . . . more 
apt”). 
 97 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (alteration in original)). 
 98 See Bamberger, supra note 9, at 1309 (observing parallel between abstention doctrines in 
state law context and doctrine of primary jurisdiction in administrative law context); Watts, supra 
note 13, at 1026 (same); cf. United States v. Mich. Nat’l Corp., 419 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1974) (observing 
procedural similarities between primary jurisdiction and Pullman abstention). See generally 
Sidney A. Shapiro, Abstention and Primary Jurisdiction: Two Chips Off the Same Block?—A 
Comparative Analysis, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 75 (1974) (comparing abstention and primary 
jurisdiction pre-Chevron). 
 99 See, e.g., Baykeeper v. NL Indus., Inc., 660 F.3d 686, 692 (3d Cir. 2011) (observing that 
invocation of primary jurisdiction appropriate only in “exceptional cases”); Access Telecomms. v. 
Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1998) (“We are always reluctant . . . to invoke 
[primary jurisdiction] because added expense and undue delay may result.” (citation omitted)). 
 100 United States v. W. Pac. R.R Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956). 
 101 Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303–04 (1976) (“[I]t may be appropriate to 
refer specific issues to an agency for initial determination where that procedure would secure 
‘uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency.’” 
(quoting Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952))). 
 102 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs.’ Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922) (observing that 
invocation of primary jurisdiction appropriate when determination requires consideration of 
“voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with 
many intricate facts . . . is indispensable, and such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in 
a body of experts”). 
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likelihood that judicial resolution would interfere with the agency’s 
execution of its overall regulatory mandate.103 
Given the obvious fit between primary jurisdiction and the theory 
of interpretive deference articulated first in Chevron and again in Brand 
X,104 it should come as no surprise that courts have deemed it 
appropriate to invoke the doctrine when confronted with an unclear 
term or provision within an agency-administered statute, hoping to 
provide the administering agency with the opportunity to construe that 
term or provision authoritatively.105 Because the costs attendant to 
abstention are, as in the state law context, substantial, courts have 
rightly seen fit—even in the wake of Brand X106—to continue to treat 
primary jurisdiction as the exception rather than the rule.107 Be that as it 
may, adherence to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the way in 
which federal courts have recognized most clearly their status as 
interpretive subordinates when acting in the absence of authoritative 
agency interpretations. 
As discussed above, federal courts acting in the state law context 
have increasingly come to rely upon certification rather than abstention 
as the preferred method for providing state courts with the opportunity 
to speak directly and authoritatively to unsettled questions of state 
law.108 For this reason, it is of at least some interest and significance 
that—although federal courts have long adhered to a regulatory 
equivalent to state law abstention doctrine in the form of primary 
jurisdiction—the practice of certification has no obvious analogue in the 
administrative law context.109 
 
 103 United States v. Phila. Nat. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963) (“[Primary jurisdiction] doctrine 
requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme 
dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the scheme.” (citations omitted)). 
 104 See supra note 98. 
 105 See Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Mass. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 163 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(“When the matter at issue is primarily one of statutory interpretation, referral of that matter to 
the agency with primary jurisdiction may also be generally advisable in precisely those 
circumstances in which a court would defer to the agency’s interpretation pursuant to [Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)].”); accord 2 KENNETH CULP 
DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.3 (3d ed. 1994) (“One of 
the many effects of Chevron is to increase the number of cases in which courts should refer issues 
to agencies under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.”). 
 106 See Watts, supra note 13, at 1029 (arguing that Brand X recommends “that the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine should be revitalized”). 
 107 See supra note 99. 
 108 See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text. 
 109 See Watts, supra note 13, at 1034–40 (recommending practice of inviting agency amicus 
briefs in the administrative law context as analogue for state certification practice). Christopher 
Walker suggests that federal courts’ adherence to the remand rule when an agency has yet to 
exercise its Chevron deference, see supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text, is best conceived as 
an analogue to certification (as opposed to abstention). See Walker, supra note 96, at 172. Even if 
that is correct, however, it remains the case that the practice of certification has no analogue in the 
administrative law context where an agency relies—as do most—on notice-and-comment 
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At least in part, federal courts’ failure to adopt a regulatory 
analogue to certification can plausibly be attributed to the fact that the 
benefits of certification familiar from the state law context would, in a 
large class of cases, fail to manifest in the administrative law context. 
Remember, in the state law context, the principal advantage of 
certification over abstention is one of efficiency: whereas abstention 
requires a state court to conduct an entirely separate trial in order to 
speak directly to the unsettled question of state law at issue, certification 
allows such a court to do so having conducted only a much more 
limited inquiry.110 Contrast this with what a practice of certification 
would look like in the administrative law context. As discussed in 
greater detail below, following Mead, federal courts will, as a rule, treat 
as authoritative only those agency interpretations issued pursuant to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.111 As such, 
certification in the administrative law context would either take the 
form of a court-issued petition for rulemaking or a request for an 
opinion from an agency adjudicator.112 Setting aside for the moment the 
option of requesting an opinion from an agency adjudicator, one can 
observe that certification in the form of a court-issued petition for 
rulemaking would provide no advantage in terms of efficiency over 
abstention. Because abstention in this context would take the form of a 
stay pending a petition for rulemaking issued by the plaintiff, the only 
functional difference between certification and abstention would be the 
name of the petitioning party.113 
In contrast with court-issued petitions for rulemaking, requests for 
opinions from agency adjudicators would preserve the efficiency 
advantage normally associated with certification. As in the state law 
context, certifying a specific interpretive question to an agency 
adjudicator would allow that adjudicator to speak directly to the 
 
rulemaking as opposed to formal adjudication as a means of articulating interpretations 
possessing the force of law. 
 110 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 112 While Professor Watts recommends the practice of inviting agency amicus briefs as the 
appropriate analogue for certification, see Watts, supra note 13, at 1034–40, that practice would in 
fact amount to no analogue at all insofar as the agency interpretations contained in the resulting 
briefs would, per Mead, be regarded by the receiving court as non-authoritative. See id. at 1040–
41 (“[U]nlike the binding views of a state’s highest court solicited using state certification 
procedures in the federalism context—agency views solicited by a federal court in the context of a 
particular case often will be set forth in an informal format, such as an amicus brief or an advisory 
opinion, ineligible for Chevron’s rule of mandatory deference” (footnotes omitted)). 
 113 Which is not to say that the different name on the petition may not matter; it is at least 
plausible that a petition from a federal court would receive greater public attention than one from 
a private individual, and that an agency would, in part for that reason, be more inclined to 
respond to a court’s petition. But see infra notes 215–23 and accompanying text (discussing 
method for inducing agencies to respond to rulemaking petitions regardless of the identity of the 
petitioner). 
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question at issue without the burden of having to conduct an entirely 
separate adjudication, as would be necessary if the federal court were to 
dismiss or stay the case pursuant to the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction.114 As a result, that federal courts have thus far failed to act 
in conjunction with either agencies or Congress to provide for this form 
of certification cannot be excused on the grounds that doing so would 
serve little or no purpose.115 Given the rule on remand described above, 
the absence of certification only becomes relevant in the somewhat 
unusual scenario where a court is confronted with an interpretive 
question pertaining to a statute administered by an agency that relies on 
formal adjudication as its preferred method of interpretation, but in the 
context of a case that did not originate in the adjudicatory context.116 
Given the relative scarcity of agencies preferring formal adjudication to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking as a means of articulating 
authoritative interpretations,117 the practical significance of that failure 
to provide for certification in the adjudicatory context is plausibly 
minimal. Be that as it may, that courts would have only infrequent 
opportunity to make use of this device does nothing to suggest that it 
ought not to be added to the toolkit. 
 
 114 Invocation of primary jurisdiction thus differs from the remand rule, see supra notes 96–97 
and accompanying text, which permits a federal court to remand a case to an agency adjudicator 
with instruction to address a specific interpretive question. See Walker, supra note 96, at 172 
(analogizing remand rule to state law certification practice). 
 115 At least insofar as the resulting advisory opinions were to have binding legal effect on the 
respective promulgating agencies. Compare Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 254 
F.3d 173, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding advisory opinions that “have binding legal effect” on 
promulgating agency eligible for Chevron deference), with Mid-Am. Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 
F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[C]ourts do not accord Chevron deference to non-binding 
advisory opinions of an administrative agency.” (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 
177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring))). 
 116 For example, in a National Labor Relations Act preemption challenge, “a party asserting 
[preemption] must advance an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary to its language 
and that has not been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by . . . the [National Labor Relations] Board.” Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 395 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Marine 
Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n v. Interlake S.S. Co., 370 U.S. 173, 184 (1962)). 
 117 In the decades immediately following the APA’s passage in 1946, the majority of agencies 
relied on adjudication as the preferred means of articulating binding agency policy. See M. 
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1398 (2004). By 
the mid-1970s, however, agencies had come to substantially prefer notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. See id.; accord J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of 
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L REV. 375, 375–76 (1974) (noting that agencies had entered the “age 
of rulemaking”). And, while concerns with “ossification” and delay has led in recent decades to 
increasing use by agencies of informal policymaking tools, see Magill, supra, at 1391 n.17, 1411 
(noting increasing reliance by agencies on nonbinding guidance documents), those agencies 
continue to rely overwhelmingly on notice-and-comment rulemaking when articulating policies 
with “the force of law.” See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1484 (2005) (observing that “[w]hile some agencies 
continue to use formal adjudication for the formulation of generally applicable standards, most 
do not” (footnotes omitted)). Notable exceptions include the National Labor Relations Board and 
the Federal Trade Commission. Magill, supra, at 1399. 
DOERFLER.36.2.2 12/18/2014  2:47 PM 
522 CARDOZO LAW REV IEW  [Vol. 36:499 
 
B.     Prediction 
While providing the relevant interpretive authority with an 
opportunity to speak directly to an unsettled interpretive question is 
perhaps the surest way for a subordinate federal court to avoid later 
conflict, sometimes the costs attendant to providing that opportunity 
outweigh the benefits secured by doing so. As a result, in many if not 
most circumstances, the most sensible course of action for a subordinate 
federal court presented with an unsettled interpretive question will be to 
answer that question directly, albeit provisionally.118 Be that as it may, 
that a subordinate federal court will sometimes have to answer such 
questions on its own does not go to suggest that that court should cease 
to be concerned with avoiding conflict with later rulings by its 
interpretive superior. In the state law context, subordinate federal courts 
have demonstrated a concern for conflict avoidance by refraining from 
exercising their independent judgment when answering the questions 
before them, opting instead to resolve such questions by predicting how 
the relevant state’s highest court would do so if it were given the 
opportunity.119 By conceiving of their task as one of prediction, 
subordinate federal courts not only avoid aggrandizing themselves at 
the expense of their interpretive superiors,120 but also minimize the 
likelihood that their determinations will conflict with later 
determinations by those same superiors.121 By contrast, in the 
administrative law context, subordinate federal courts have 
demonstrated much less of a concern with conflict avoidance, at least 
overtly embracing the approach of exercising their independent 
judgment concerning the “best” available answer to the particular 
 
 118 See Bamberger, supra note 9, at 1308 (observing that “in nearly every instance in which a 
federal court is faced with an open state law question, it decides it. . . . provisional[ly]”). 
 119 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (2d ed. 
1996) (observing that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction “must determine issues of 
state law as it believes the highest court of the state would determine them”). For obvious reasons, 
this practice has come to be known as making an “Erie guess.” E.g., Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co., 354 
F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (observing that, in a “highly uncertain area of state law,” a federal 
court is “forc[ed] . . . to make an educated ‘Erie guess’”); Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736, 739 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (observing that, when the content of state law is unclear, federal court must make an 
“Erie guess” and determine as best as it can what the state’s highest court would decide). 
 120 See Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046–47 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Because a 
federal court’s prediction of state law, until and unless overruled by the state supreme court, tends 
to verge on the lawmaking function of the highest state court, it is critical that the federal court do 
all within its power to view the problem before it as a state court would, and not through the eyes 
of a court steeped in federal law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 121 Adherence to the predictive approach minimizes federal court “error,” Arizonans for 
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997), and, hence, future conflict with state court 
determinations by “insur[ing] that diversity cases will have the same outcome, as far as possible, 
whether they are filed in a state court or a federal court sitting in the territory of that state.” 
Yohannon v. Keene Corp., 924 F.2d 1255, 1267 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). 
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interpretive questions put before them.122 Of even greater consequence, 
subordinate federal courts acting in the administrative law context have, 
following Mead, made a practice of disregarding direct, though non-
authoritative statements on the matter from the agencies with primary 
interpretive authority concerning the interpretive questions before those 
courts on the grounds that such statements are not “persuasive.”123 As a 
result, federal courts have, in the administrative law context, not only 
increased antagonism between themselves and their interpretive 
superiors, but also brought about increased unfairness to individual 
litigants by increasing the likelihood of inconsistent rulings with respect 
to like cases. 
1.     State Law 
Assuming that abstention or certification is impracticable,124 a 
federal court presented with an unsettled question of state law will, in 
nearly all cases, arrive at an answer by attempting to predict what the 
relevant state’s highest court would rule if presented with the question at 
issue.125 While the Supreme Court has never squarely endorsed this 
practice of prediction (as contrasted with the practices of abstention126 
and certification127), several of the Court’s opinions do suggest that 
 
 122 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 123 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006) (declining to defer to nonbinding 
interpretation promulgated by Attorney General on grounds that Court “do[es] not find the 
Attorney General’s opinion persuasive”); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) 
(refusing to defer to interpretation contained in agency opinion letter on grounds that Court 
“find[s] unpersuasive the agency’s interpretation of the statute at issue”). 
 124 Or that a request for certification has been declined. See Marin Tug & Barge, Inc. v. 
Westport Petroleum, Inc., 271 F.3d 825, 829–30 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The state supreme court 
declined our request for certification. Accordingly, we must ‘predict as best we can what the 
California Supreme Court would do in these circumstances.’” (quoting Pacheco v. United States, 
220 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000))). 
 125 While the overwhelming majority of courts adhere to the predictive approach when an 
authoritative interpretation of state law is unavailable, see supra note 119, a minority of courts 
adhere to what Bradford Clark refers to as the “static approach.” Clark, supra note 32, at 1535. 
Pursuant to that approach a federal court will refuse to recognize any cause of action or defense 
that is not clearly established by state law. Id. at 1536–37. According to Professor Clark, federal 
courts ought to prefer the static to the predictive approach on federalism grounds. See infra note 
129. However, as Clark concedes, adherence to the static approach risks both forum-shopping 
and inequitable administration of state law. See Clark, supra note 32, at 1542 (“If federal courts 
employ the static approach, parties benefited by the status quo will inevitably seek to litigate their 
cases in federal, rather than state, court because federal courts will rule against the proponent of a 
novel claim or defense unless the party can establish that it has been adopted by an appropriate 
organ of the state.”). 
 126 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 127 See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
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prediction is the preferred approach when an authoritative 
interpretation is unavailable.128 
Like abstention and certification, prediction by federal courts is a 
practice rooted in a concern for federalism.129 In Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,130 the Supreme Court famously held that, except in matters 
 
 128 See, e.g., Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 241 (1991) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]n a case such as this where the state law is unsettled . . . . the courts’ task is to try to predict 
how the highest court of that State would decide the question.”); West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 
U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (observing that state intermediate court pronouncement of state law “is not 
to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest 
court of the state would decide otherwise”). 
 129 Most federal courts understand the duty to predict how a state’s highest court would 
answer a question of state law that it has yet to address as following straightaway from Erie’s 
federalism-based command that federal courts defer to a state’s highest court’s state law 
determinations. See, e.g., Wayne Moving & Storage of N.J., Inc. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 625 F.3d 
148, 154 (3d Cir. 2010) (“A federal court under Erie is bound to follow state law as announced by 
the highest state court. . . . [W]hen the state’s highest court has not addressed the precise question 
presented, [we] must predict how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue.” (quoting 
Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“If the mandate of Erie is to be satisfied and the law ultimately employed is to be the law of the 
state, the federal court, exercising its authority to hear diversity cases, must make a predictive 
judgment as to how the supreme court of the state would decide the matter if it were presented 
presently to that tribunal.” (footnote omitted)). Professor Clark argues that federalism concerns 
actually militate against prediction insofar as the resolution of state law uncertainties, however 
provisional, inevitably involves the exercise of just the sort of policymaking discretion that Erie 
reserved to the states. Clark, supra note 32, at 1500 (“The exercise of substantial policymaking 
discretion is the essence of lawmaking[, and that while] [t]he exercise of such discretion by state 
courts ‘is not a matter of federal concern’ because the Constitution imposes few, if any, 
restrictions on judicial lawmaking at the state level, [t]he exercise of substantial policymaking 
discretion by federal courts . . . raises serious judicial federalism concerns” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938))). For that reason, Clark recommends, 
instead of the predictive of approach, that federal courts adhere to the “static approach,” refusing 
to recognize any state law cause of action or defense not obviously recognized by either the state 
courts or the state legislature. See id. at 1540–41 (arguing that the static approach “eliminates the 
possibility that federal courts will usurp state lawmaking power by erroneously or prematurely 
making the fundamental policy choices that are necessary to recognize (and apply) novel rules of 
decision on behalf of a state,” and thereby “operates to reserve state lawmaking power to agents of 
the state by preventing federal courts from circumventing the procedural and political safeguards 
of federalism” (footnote omitted)). Insofar as one conceives of judicial federalism as establishing 
within the domain of state law a relationship between state and federal courts of interpretive 
superior and subordinate, see supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text, however, the thought 
that judicial federalism requires that federal courts refuse to consider how their state court 
superiors would resolve a question not yet addressed authoritatively becomes somewhat difficult 
to maintain. Cf. In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612–13 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e should not idly 
ignore considered statements the Supreme Court makes in dicta. The Supreme Court uses dicta to 
help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide because of its limited docket. 
‘Appellate courts that dismiss these expressions [in dicta] and strike off on their own increase the 
disparity among tribunals (for other judges are likely to follow the Supreme Court’s marching 
orders) and frustrate the evenhanded administration of justice by giving litigants an outcome 
other than the one the Supreme Court would be likely to reach were the case heard there.’” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 
1998))). 
 130 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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governed by positive federal law, federal courts are to apply “the law of 
the state.”131 Recognizing at the same time that the Constitution reserves 
to the states exclusive authority as to the content of their laws,132 the 
Court went on to observe that, in the course of applying state law, 
federal courts must take pains not to “declare” it.133 In an effort to 
comply with this dual command to apply but not to declare state law, 
federal courts reject with near uniformity the impulse to rely 
(explicitly134) upon independent judgment when formulating answers to 
unsettled questions within that domain.135 Instead, in an effort to 
minimize any disparity in outcome between federal and would-be state 
court proceedings, the vast majority of federal courts limit themselves to 
predicting how a given question would be resolved if it were to proceed 
through the relevant state court system, including appellate review.136 By 
treating would-be state court rulings as the baseline against which to 
measure their own, federal courts manifest recognition that “[s]tate 
courts,” not federal courts, “are the final arbiters of their own state 
law.”137 Moreover, by adhering to the predictive approach, federal courts 
minimize the likelihood of conflict with future authoritative state court 
rulings,138 thereby advancing basic fairness interests by ensuring as best 
as possible consistency in outcomes across individual litigants.139 Last 
 
 131 Id. at 78. 
 132 Id. at 78–79 (“[T]he constitution of the United States . . . recognizes and preserves the 
autonomy and independence of the states,—independence in their legislative and independence 
in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the 
states is in no case permissible except as to matters by the constitution specifically authorized or 
delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an 
invasion of the authority of the state, and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.”). 
 133 Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
 134 See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 135 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Columbus, Ohio v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222, 228 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (Alito, J., concurring) (“Because this is a diversity action, however, we are not free to 
exercise our independent judgment but must instead predict how the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would rule.”); Kathios v. Gen. Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 949 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[A 
federal court’s] function [in a diversity case] is not to formulate a tenet which we, as free agents, 
might think wise, but to ascertain, as best we can, the rule that the state’s highest tribunal would 
likely follow.” (citation omitted)). 
 136 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 79, § 4507 (observing that federal courts must do their best 
to “ensure that the outcome of the litigation be substantially the same as it would be if tried in a 
state court and subjected to that system’s appellate process” in order to prevent forum-shopping). 
 137 Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 291 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 138 Strictly speaking, a federal court’s ‘prediction’ is not a prediction but a counterfactual 
assessment concerning what would have happened if the dispute at issue had been resolved by the 
relevant state court system, including appellate review. However, the practical effect of making 
such a prediction is to minimize conflict with later, actual authoritative state court rulings. 
 139 Given the paucity of available evidence, federal courts tend to be circumspect concerning 
the accuracy of their state law predictions. See infra note 142. Limited as it may be, however, the 
fact remains that issuing a prediction predicated upon all available evidence, see McKenna v. 
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980) (discussing the range of evidence federal 
court ought to consider when formulating state law prediction), is often the best that a federal 
court can do in terms of ensuring equitable administration of state law. 
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and related, by minimizing the likelihood of conflict with counterfactual 
authoritative state court rulings, federal courts that limit themselves to 
prediction advance the anti-forum shopping rationale140 underlying in 
part the decision in Erie.141 
Because a federal court will often find itself with a relatively sparse 
and inconclusive evidentiary base upon which to draw when engaging 
in a predictive inquiry, the accuracy of such a court’s predictions can be 
expected to be modest at best.142 Moreover, and perhaps of greater 
consequence, because the evidence available in a given case will often be 
inconclusive, a federal court retains, under the predictive approach, 
substantial discretion with respect to the conclusions it ultimately 
arrives at, discretion that, as Professor Clark argues, that court might 
use to implement its own policy preferences under the guise of 
“‘prediction.’”143 In this way, the predictive approach threatens, in the 
worst-case scenario, to simply collapse into the independent judgment 
approach. Be that as it may, that the predictive approach promises only 
modest benefits in the best-case scenario and no benefits in the worst 
does nothing to suggest that federal courts would be better off instead 
relying upon independent judgment. Rather, all that the above concerns 
suggest is that the predictive approach is an imperfect solution to the 
problems that arise when a federal court, acting as an interpretive 
 
 140 See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“In essence, the intent of t[he 
Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely 
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal 
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, 
as it would be if tried in a State court.”). 
 141 See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State 
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 162 (2003) (“[W]hen facing an 
unsettled or unclear precedent on an important issue of state law, the federal court must review 
the law available and predict how the highest court in the state would most likely rule, rather than 
develop a federal common law rule which might differ from the state law rule and encourage 
forum shopping.” (footnote omitted)). 
 142 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As a 
federal court sitting in diversity, we are charged with predicting how another court—in this case, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court—would rule on the record presented to us. Because of the dearth 
of directly on-point New Jersey case law, this case represents yet another example of how difficult 
the predictive exercise can be.” (citation omitted)); Labiche v. Legal Sec. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 350, 
354 (5th Cir. 1994) (“We recognize that the task of predicting the final course to be taken by the 
supreme court of a state is a difficult one. The Erie guesses made under circumstances such as 
presented in this case are many times wrong. We have no assurance that the predictions we make 
today will ultimately fare better than the notable similar forays into diversity jurisdiction that have 
missed the mark.”). 
 143 Clark, supra note 32, at 1499 (“Because state law generally fails to provide meaningful 
guidance regarding what weight, if any, to give such materials, a federal court’s ‘prediction’ of 
state law frequently devolves into little more than a choice among competing policy 
considerations.” (footnote omitted)). 
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subordinate, is asked to address an interpretive question absent direct 
guidance from its interpretive superior.144 
2.     Regulatory Law 
A federal court attempting to construe an unclear term or 
provision within a regulatory statute in the absence of any direct input 
from the administering agency will, at least nominally, do so as it would 
any other such term or provision, namely through the application of the 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation.145 Whether in so doing such 
a court could covertly predict how the agency would construe the 
statute turns out to be a difficult question.146 Regardless, when 
construing such a term or provision in the presence of a direct though 
legally nonbinding indication of the administering agency’s preferred 
interpretation, federal courts have demonstrated a clear willingness to 
disregard the agency’s preference.147 In an effort to comply with Mead’s 
instruction not to treat as authoritative agency interpretations contained 
in instruments lacking “the force of law,”148 federal courts have thus 
failed to implement—at least in full—the predictive approach in the 
administrative law context. This is because the full implementation of 
 
 144 Professor Clark argues that the predictive approach is at least not preferable to the “static 
approach,” see supra note 125, for the reason that both approaches invite forum shopping and, in 
turn, inequitable administration of state law. See Clark, supra note 32, at 1541–43. The static 
approach invites forum shopping for reasons discussed above. See supra note 125. The predictive 
approach, Clark contends, invites forum shopping because litigants will seek to take advantage of 
federal court predictions that state courts have yet to have the opportunity to test. See Clark, supra 
note 32, at 1542. Clark suggests that the threat of forum shopping, and, hence, inequitable 
administration, is roughly equivalent under either approach. See id. at 1543 (“[T]here is no 
apparent reason to conclude that one form of forum shopping is preferable to the other.” 
(footnote omitted)). To this, two responses: first, in the scenario where federal courts have yet to 
consider the unsettled question of state law at issue, the risk of forum shopping under the static 
approach is much greater; this is because the static approach, unlike the predictive approach, 
renders the outcome in one of the two forums certain. Second and more fundamental, so long as 
variable federal court predictions yield, in the aggregate, a more accurate forecast of state law than 
a blanket ‘prediction’ of stagnancy, the incentive to forum shopping will, ceteris paribus, be less 
under the predictive approach than under the static approach. 
 145 See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 
(2005) (observing that, in the absence of agency interpretation, interpreting court is left to discern 
“the best reading of the statute”); Molly A. Leckey & Stephanie A. Roy, Recent Decisions of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 946, 954 (2004) (observing that, outside Chevron’s domain, a “court will simply 
engage in a de novo review of the statute through the use of traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation”). 
 146 See infra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 147 E.g., Hickman & Krueger, supra note 74, at 1275 (observing that, post-Mead, federal courts 
of appeals have rejected nonbinding agency interpretations 39.6% of the time when applying 
Skidmore framework). 
 148 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001); accord Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
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the predictive approach in the administrative law context would result 
in consistent deferral to such non-authoritative agency interpretations, 
rendering Mead’s instruction mostly moot. 
a.     No Direct Guidance 
Absent any direct input from the relevant agency, a federal court 
will, at least nominally, construe an unclear term or provision contained 
within a regulatory statute in the same way that it would any other such 
term or provision, namely through the application of the traditional 
tools of statutory construction. That a federal court defaults in this 
context to the traditional tools of statutory construction is problematic 
for two reasons. First, as suggested above, because this approach 
involves a federal court exercising its independent judgment concerning 
how the relevant term or provision is best construed, it in turn involves 
that court aggrandizing itself at the expense of the agency that retains 
primary interpretive authority.149 Second, and perhaps more 
consequentially, because the traditional tools of statutory construction 
are tools for maximizing interpretive fidelity as opposed to policy 
outcomes,150 reliance on those tools by federal courts when construing 
regulatory statutes in the first instances has at least the potential to 
result in a systematic increase in the likelihood that the interpretations 
offered by courts will eventually come into conflict with a later, 
authoritative interpretation by the relevant agency. 
As to the second concern, remember again that, at least from the 
standpoint of an agency, statutory interpretation under Chevron is a 
two-step process: At step one, the agency applies the traditional tools of 
statutory construction to a given term or provision, determining the 
range of interpretations that are reasonably available given the statute’s 
text, structure, purpose, etc.; at step two, the agency evaluates that range 
of reasonably available interpretations in light of its policy goals and 
preferences, selecting the interpretation that accords with those goals 
and preferences best.151 So understood, statutory interpretation as 
practiced within Chevron’s domain is markedly different from that task 
as practiced without. In the run-of-the-mill case, while considerations of 
policy may inform a court’s interpretation of a given statutory term of 
provision,152 a court ultimately regards itself as beholden to the 
(legislatively embodied153) intent of the enacting Congress.154 When best 
 
 149 See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. 
 150 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
 151 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 152 See Scalia, supra note 49, at 515 (“[T]he ‘traditional tools of statutory construction’ include 
not merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the consideration of policy 
consequences.”). 
 153 As John Manning observes, both modern textualists and “Legal Process-style” purposivists 
accept that the “intent” relevant to statutory interpretation is not the subjective intentions of 
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policy and fidelity to congressional intent call for different results, it is 
the latter that is thus supposed to prevail.155 And, for that reason, it is 
the latter that the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation are 
calibrated to track.156 
Because the traditional tools of statutory interpretation are 
designed to advance the value of fidelity over that of best policy, the 
practice of federal courts construing unclear regulatory statutes just 
through the application of those tools systematically increases the 
likelihood that federal court interpretations will come into conflict with 
later, authoritative agency interpretations. To see why, consider AT&T 
Corporation v. City of Portland,157 the decision articulating provisional 
precedent that the Supreme Court eventually allowed to be supplanted 
in Brand X.158 In Portland, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine 
whether broadband internet service is properly characterized as a 
“telecommunications service” for purposes of the Communications Act 
of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.159 In 
making that determination, the Ninth Circuit stated plainly—at the 
outset—that the task before it was one of faithful interpretation rather 
than policymaking, remarking: 
The parties, and numerous amici, forcefully urge us to consider what 
our national policy should be concerning open access to the Internet. 
However, that is not our task . . . . [W]e address the Internet aware 
that courts are ill-suited to fix its flow; instead, we draw our bearings 
from the legal landscape, and chart a course by the law’s words. To 
 
actual legislators, but rather an “‘objectified’” or “constructive” intent derived from legislative text 
taken in context. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 70, 79, 90–91, 102–03 (2006). 
 154 See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (“Our [interpretive] 
task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably 
plain terms, ‘that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’” (quoting Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980))); United States v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is 
easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 155 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our individual appraisal of the 
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside 
in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its 
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.”). 
 156 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 209 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing “canons of statutory constructions” as “tools to be used to divine congressional 
intent” (emphasis omitted)); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 
U.S. 112, 123 (1987) (“On a pure question of statutory construction, [a court’s] first job is to try to 
determine congressional intent, using ‘traditional tools of statutory construction.’”). 
 157 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 158 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984–85 (2005) 
(holding that Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Telecommunications Act in Portland does not 
trump FCC’s later, conflicting interpretation). 
 159 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
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that end, “we look first to the plain language of the statute, 
construing the provisions of the entire law, including its object and 
policy.”160 
With its task so conceived, the Ninth Circuit went on to determine 
that broadband service is properly classified as a “telecommunications 
service” for purposes of the Act as amended, a determination that was 
ultimately displaced by a later, conflicting determination by the FCC.161 
What is relevant here is not so much the fact of eventual displacement—
that can happen with any provisional determination—as the extent to 
which the Ninth Circuit’s methodological approach lends itself to 
determinations that will eventually be displaced. Whereas courts like the 
Ninth Circuit seek to avoid “consider[ing] what our national policy 
should be” in issuing its interpretation of an unclear regulatory statute, 
it is precisely that consideration that will, under Chevron, guide the 
relevant agency when it gets around to interpreting that very same 
statute.162 As a result, while it is understandable that a federal court 
might wish to avoid engaging in “naked” acts of policymaking163—
whether for reasons of institutional competence,164 separation of 
powers,165 or both—that such a court bases its interpretation on 
considerations other than policy makes it all the more likely that that 
interpretation will come into conflict with the policy-based 
interpretation put forward by the relevant agency at some later date. 
To the Ninth Circuit’s credit, that court’s approach in Portland 
may have conformed to the predictive approach much more closely in 
practice than one might have thought on the basis of the court’s 
characterization of its preferred methodology. The court began its 
opinion by observing that the FCC had “declined, both in its regulatory 
capacity and as amicus curiae, to address the issue before” the court,166 
suggesting that the court was at least open to taking into account any 
policy positions the FCC might have articulated through a nonbinding 
instrument such as a legal brief. Moreover, in reaching its ultimate 
determination, the court reasoned “the definition of cable broadband as 
a telecommunications service coheres with the overall structure of the 
Communications Act as amended . . . and the FCC’s existing regulatory 
 
 160 Portland, 216 F.3d at 876 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 
1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 161 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 162 See supra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. 
 163 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning that 
non-legislative body’s exercise of lawmaking power that is “not ancillary” to exercise of other 
power but is instead “quite naked” violates separation of powers). 
 164 See supra note 58. 
 165 See supra note 65. 
 166 AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). 
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regime.”167 Left without any indication from the FCC of any policy 
judgments not already embodied in current regulations, it is at least 
possible that, by adopting the interpretation that it deemed to best 
cohere with those regulations, the court was effectively judging that, 
given the available evidence, it was most likely that the FCC would 
classify broadband service as a “telecommunications service” if it were 
to make that determination.168 
Whatever was the case in Portland, what to take away from the 
above discussion is that, insofar as a federal court finds itself left to 
answer an interpretive question absent any direct guidance from the 
relevant agency,169 the best available approach is plausibly for that court 
to rely upon the policy judgments it perceives to be reflected in any 
indirectly related actions taken by the relevant agency.170 Such an 
approach would allow a court to answer the interpretive question before 
it in a way that, to the best of that court’s knowledge, reflects current 
agency thinking. Moreover, such an approach would help that court to 
avoid the dilemma it would otherwise face, namely a choice between 
relying on its own policy judgment—again, unattractive based upon 
institutional competence and separation of powers concerns—or 
assigning excessive evidentiary weight to considerations that might 
inadequately reflect the pragmatic nature of statutory “interpretation” 
within Chevron’s domain.171 While a court adhering to the predictive 
approach in such circumstances would have no guarantee that its 
arrived at interpretation will not come into conflict with a later, 
authoritative agency interpretation (e.g., an agency might have made 
policy judgments not yet reflected in any agency action, or that agency 
 
 167 Id. at 879 (emphasis added). 
 168 Viewed in this light, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, although ultimately displaced, 
might have been as accurate as possible a forecast of the FCC’s future course of action, given the 
limited available evidence. In this respect, that court’s position mirrored that of so many federal 
courts left to forecast state court action on the basis of evidence ranging from scant to 
nonexistent. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 169 This leaves open the possibility that a federal court has an obligation to solicit such direct 
guidance through, for example, an invitation to file an amicus brief. See Watts, supra note 13, at 
1034 (“Inviting an agency to file an amicus brief, therefore, could be particularly appropriate 
where a court wants to expeditiously solicit the views of an agency that has not previously set 
forth any views whatsoever, or where the court needs clarification about an informal 
interpretation issued by the agency in the past.”). 
 170 In this respect, the ‘interpretive’ methodology appropriate looks somewhat like the 
methodology proposed by Ronald Dworkin for resolving so-called “hard cases.” See RONALD 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 84–86 (1977) (arguing that judges ought to resolve “hard 
cases,” i.e., cases not resolvable by appeal to existing legal rules, by appeal to general normative 
“principles” embodied in the laws); accord Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: 
Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1721 (2005) (“Policies, principles, 
and the like operate as background features which work behind the legal rules: pervading 
doctrine, filling in gaps, helping us with hard cases, providing touchstones for legal argument, and 
in a sense capturing the underlying spirit of whole areas of doctrine.”). 
 171 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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might simply revise its policy judgments at some point before it 
addresses directly the interpretive question at issue), that court would 
have done as well as possible, given the available information,172 to 
minimize the chance of that unattractive outcome. 
b.     Non-Authoritative Interpretations 
Whether federal courts acting in the absence of direct agency 
guidance in fact adhere to the predictive approach under the guise of 
applying the traditional tools of statutory construction is an empirical 
question that is not easily resolved.173 Much easier to resolve, and of 
much greater consequence, is that federal courts fail to adhere to the 
predictive approach, at least in full, when acting in the presence of direct 
agency guidance when such guidance is contained within an instrument 
lacking “the force of law.”174 Under current doctrine, an agency 
interpretation articulated in a legally nonbinding instrument such as a 
legal brief or non-legislative rule is to be regarded by a federal court as 
ineligible for deference under Chevron.175 In an effort to give effect to 
this stated limitation on Chevron’s domain, a federal court asked to 
construe an unclear term or provision within a regulatory statute will, as 
discussed above, attempt to discern for itself the “best” interpretation of 
the term or provision at issue, treating any agency interpretation that 
lacks “the force of law” as merely persuasive authority.176 
In Mead, the Court announced most clearly the now settled 
principle that only a relatively narrow subset of agency interpretations is 
 
 172 But see supra note 169. 
 173 In part, this is because of the difficulty of determining whether a court operating in such 
circumstances regards the meaning of the statutory term or provision as sufficiently “silent or 
ambiguous” to satisfy Chevron Step One. See Note, Implementing Brand X: What Counts as a Step 
One Holding?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1532 (2006) (observing that courts seeking to implement 
Brand X face the “challenging” task of discerning whether the earlier court regarded its 
interpretation as “the only reasonable one”). 
 174 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). The appropriateness of prediction in 
administrative law has received scant attention from courts and scholars alike. But see In re 
StarNet, Inc., 355 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.) (invoking doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction as an alternative to predicting how FCC would resolve uncertainty). For instance, in 
her article expanding upon the analogy between the state and administrative law context, 
Professor Watts considers and rejects the predictive approach in a two-sentence footnote, 
reasoning that adherence to that approach would require courts to consciously take into account 
electoral outcomes. See Watts, supra note 13, at 1022 n.144 (“[A] court trying to ‘predict’ what the 
EPA might do under a new Republican administration would have to take the President’s policy 
goals and politics into account in arriving at a construction of an ambiguous statutory term.”). 
That Watts takes this prospect to be an obvious objection is odd, given the at least plausible 
acceptability of agencies relying on electoral outcomes as justification for changes in 
interpretation. See supra note 54. Worse still, Watts fails to even consider the numerous costs 
inherent to the alternative, i.e., relying on independent judgment. 
 175 See infra notes 178–83 and accompanying text. 
 176 See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
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potentially eligible for deference under Chevron.177 In that case, the 
Court considered whether a tariff classification ruling by Customs 
Service characterizing three-ring “day planners” as “[d]iaries . . . bound” 
for purposes of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
(HTSUS), thereby rendering day planners subject to a four percent 
tariff, might warrant deference under Chevron.178 Holding that the 
classification ruling was not a candidate for Chevron deference, the 
Court reasoned that an agency interpretation of an ambiguous term or 
provision is a candidate for deference only “when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to [that] agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law,” and when that agency’s interpretation “was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”179 While the Court was 
careful to note that procedural formality is not the only indicator of a 
congressional intent to delegate,180 Mead has largely come to stand for 
the proposition that only interpretations arrived at through notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication are eligible for deference 
under Chevron.181 Its exact contours aside, however, what is clear from 
the holding in Mead is that agencies are not to receive deference under 
Chevron for an interpretation articulated in an instrument clearly 
lacking the “force of law,” such as a legal brief or non-legislative rule.182 
Rather than instructing courts to disregard entirely interpretations 
contained within nonbinding instruments, the majority in Mead went 
on to hold that courts are to accord to non-authoritative agency 
interpretations “respect proportional to [their] ‘power to persuade.’”183 
 
 177 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–30. 
 178 Id. at 225–26. 
 179 Id. at 226–27. 
 180 See id. at 231 (“[T]he want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for [the Court] 
ha[s] sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative 
formality was required and none was afforded . . . .” (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable 
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995))). 
 181 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1483 (2011) (characterizing Mead as treating “procedural formality as the 
touchstone for Chevron deference”); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 359 (2003) (characterizing Mead as establishing procedural formality as 
“the trigger for Chevron deference”). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 
187, 219–21 (2006) (describing a series of post-Mead court of appeals decisions according 
Chevron deference to agency interpretations not arrived at pursuant to formal procedures). 
 182 As Cass Sunstein observes, “an agency may make rules that are binding, in the sense that 
they have the force of law, without notice-and-comment when the rules involve agency procedure 
or when there is ‘good cause’ for dispensing with notice-and-comment processes.” Sunstein, supra 
note 181, at 223 (footnote omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012)). 
 183 Mead, 533 U.S. at 235 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). As the 
Court went on to explain, a nonbinding interpretation “may surely claim the merit of its writer’s 
thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of 
weight.” Id.; see also Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (“The weight [accorded to an administrative] 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those 
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”). 
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As a result, when a federal court has at its disposal only some such non-
authoritative agency interpretation, that court is expected, it would 
appear, to conduct an independent inquiry (e.g., through the application 
of the traditional tools of statutory construction184) concerning the 
“best” possible interpretation of the unclear term or provision with 
which it is presented,185 taking into account said nonbinding 
interpretation only insofar as it sheds light on what that “best” possible 
interpretation might be.186 Similar to the scenario discussed above,187 the 
extent to which such inquiries are truly independent is difficult to 
discern.188 At the same time, what is not at all difficult to discern is that, 
with significant frequency, federal courts interpret ambiguous terms or 
provisions in ways that are directly contrary to the non-authoritative 
agency interpretations that those courts have at their disposal.189 
In another vociferous dissent, Justice Scalia took the majority in 
Mead to task for displacing what he took to be Chevron’s general 
presumption of a congressional intent to delegate with a system under 
which courts would determine case-by-case and on the basis of a 
standardless totality of the circumstances test whether Congress 
intended to delegate interpretive authority to individual agencies 
seeking deference.190 As an alternative to this perceived dystopian 
regime, Justice Scalia argued that the Court ought to have affirmed the 
principle that he understood Chevron to stand for, namely that “all 
 
 184 For example, on remand, the Federal Circuit ruled that the three-ring day planners at issue 
in Mead were “neither ‘diaries’ nor ‘bound,’” relying primarily on dictionary definitions of both 
terms. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1342, 1346–50 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 185 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 186 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 6, at 681 (“Under [Skidmore], the agency bears the burden of 
persuading the court to exercise its independent judgment in the agency’s favor. In exercising 
such judgment, however, the reviewing court must take account of the special resources that the 
agency brings to the task.”); Watts, supra note 13, at 1007–08 (“[Within the Skidmore framework,] 
the ultimate responsibility for selecting a preferred construction of the statutory ambiguity rests 
with the court. Skidmore, therefore, does not displace the independent judgment model. Rather, it 
merely serves as a tool that courts can use along with other traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 187 See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text. 
 188 See, e.g., Hickman & Krueger, supra note 74, at 1255, 1281 (articulating alternative 
conception of Skidmore, according to which deference accorded “along a continuum or sliding 
scale, with the degree of deference varying according to the reviewing court’s evaluation of 
Skidmore’s contextual factors,” arguing “that the courts of appeals overwhelmingly approach 
Skidmore in the mode of a sliding scale” (footnote omitted)); Russell L. Weaver, The Emperor Has 
No Clothes: Christensen, Mead and Dual Deference Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 178 (2002) 
(“[W]hen a court applies the Skidmore standard, actual deference is always a distinct possibility 
even though Skidmore’s articulated standard suggests the reviewing court should exercise 
independent judgment.”). 
 189 See supra note 147. 
 190 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has 
largely replaced Chevron, in other words, with that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be 
held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): . . . ‘totality of the 
circumstances’ test.”). 
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authoritative agency interpretations of statutes they are charged with 
administering deserve deference,” no matter, for example, the degree of 
procedural formality involved in arriving at such an interpretation.191 Of 
particular significance, Justice Scalia observed that the interpretation at 
issue in the case at hand, the Customs Service’s construal of 
“diaries . . . bound,” constituted an authoritative agency interpretation, 
i.e., an interpretation “that represents the official position of the 
agency,”192 insofar as that interpretation, originally signed only by the 
Director of the Commercial Rulings Branch of Customs Headquarters’ 
Office of Regulations and Rulings, had been endorsed in a legal brief 
filed by the Solicitor General and co-signed by the Treasury’s General 
Counsel.193 Asserting that an agency interpretation is to be regarded as 
“authoritative” insofar as it “represent[s] the judgment of central agency 
management, approved at the highest levels,” Justice Scalia remarked 
that a decision by an agency’s general counsel to defend an 
interpretation in court, let alone a decision by the Solicitor General in 
conjunction with a general counsel to defend that interpretation before 
the Supreme Court, surely indicates the interpretation in question 
represents the agency’s authoritative view.194 
Setting aside the merits of Justice Scalia’s critique, what is striking 
is the extent to which one arrives at a (near) functional equivalent to 
Justice Scalia’s affirmative position insofar as one accepts that federal 
courts must adhere to the predictive approach—taking into account all 
available information195—when making sense of an unclear regulatory 
statute in the absence of a controlling agency interpretation. The reason 
why is straightforward: insofar as one was attempting to predict whether 
the Department of the Treasury, acting in its capacity as the primary 
interpretive authority, would classify three-ring day planners as 
“diaries . . . bound” for purposes of the HTSUS, what better evidence 
could one imagine than a legal brief filed by the Solicitor General and 
co-signed by Treasury’s General Counsel endorsing that 
classification?196 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 257. 
 193 Id. at 258. 
 194 Id. at 258 n.6. 
 195 In other words, information contained in binding and nonbinding interpretations alike. 
 196 David Barron and Justice (then-Professor) Elena Kagan cautioned that agency heads will 
often feel compelled, for reasons having to do with morale, solidarity, etc., to affirm the 
interpretations arrived at by their subordinates, particularly in the context of a final agency action. 
See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 
259 (2001) (observing that “[r]atification often will occur within agencies in near automatic 
fashion”). For that reason, Kagan and Barron caution against regarding an agency’s litigating 
position as the principal indicia of an agency’s “official” policy, at least insofar as that “official” 
policy is supposed to reflect the considered judgment of the agency head. See id. at 258–60. What 
Barron and Kagan fail to explain, however, is why one would not expect this tendency to affirm to 
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To put the point more generally: under the predictive approach, a 
federal court will attempt to resolve the interpretive questions before it 
by asking, “how would the agency answer this question, if it were to do 
so authoritatively?” As discussed above, in some situations, the agency 
in question will have failed to speak directly to the interpretive question 
at issue, leaving the court to predict that agency’s likely future behavior 
on the basis of its indirectly related past actions.197 At the same time, 
particularly in light of the ease with which an agency can communicate 
its views to a court through the use of legal briefs, a court will very often 
find itself with ready access to remarks from the relevant agency that do 
address the question at issue directly.198 And, in the vast majority of 
those cases, the only epistemically defensible answer a court could give 
to the question, “What would the agency do?” will be, “What it says it 
would.”199 As a result, under the predictive approach, Mead’s instruction 
not to accord deference under Chevron to agency interpretations 
contained in instruments lacking “the force of law” would be rendered 
mostly moot insofar as such interpretations would, barring unusual 
circumstances, be treated as dispositive evidence for purposes of the 
court’s predictive inquiry.200 
 
manifest in the context of a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding or formal adjudication. 
In other words, even if one accepts that this tendency, assuming it to be real, is unfortunate from 
the standpoint of wise policymaking, this leaves open the possibility that the influence of that 
tendency on policymaking decisions is unavoidable. More modestly, even if one assumes, not 
implausibly, that the tendency to affirm will be at least weaker in the context of a rulemaking 
proceeding than in a litigation arising out of the final agency action in which the interpretation at 
issue was articulated, there is very little reason to believe that courts will be well-positioned to 
discern instances of affirmation that the agency head will “come to regret,” so to speak, from 
those that she will not. And, in those cases where such an assessment would be defensible, i.e., 
where the assessment would be plausibly characterized as something other than the court 
substituting its own judgment for the agency’s, the evidence establishing the assessment’s 
defensibility would provide a specific basis for predicting a change of agency course. For that 
reason, any sort of blanket skepticism towards an agency doing ‘what is says it would’ would be 
both epistemically unwarranted and practically unnecessary. 
 197 See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 198 See Watts, supra note 13, at 1034–40 (discussing ready availability of agency views as 
contained in amicus briefs, particularly via court solicitation). 
 199 See Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 
771, 788 (2002) (“Where, however, the court does reach the merits of a statutory interpretation 
rendered in an informal format, it presumably will have concluded that the action is a reliable 
predictor of what the agency would do if it were rendering a binding decision.”). 
 200 In the state law context, probably the closest analogue to non-authoritative agency 
pronouncements is dicta from a state’s highest court. Federal courts assign varying weight to such 
dicta when predicting how a state’s highest court would rule. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharm. 
Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Considered dicta by the state’s highest court may also 
provide a federal court with reliable indicia of how the state tribunal might rule on a particular 
question. Because the highest state court enjoys some latitude of decision in ascertaining the law 
applicable to a particular dispute even where there may be dicta in point, however, a federal court 
should be circumspect in surrendering its own judgment concerning what the state law is on 
account of dicta. As Professor Charles Alan Wright has written, much depends on the character 
of the dictum.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)  (quoting CHARLES ALAN 
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c.     Prediction and Incentive to Adhere to Formal Procedures 
In terms of benefits, the advantages of adhering to the predictive 
approach are even greater in the administrative than the state law 
context. First, by framing the inquiry in terms of what it thinks that the 
agency would do, as opposed to what it should do, the federal court 
acting in the administrative law context, as in the state law context, 
would avoid aggrandizing itself at the expense of its interpretive 
superior.201 Second, because the federal court would, in virtue of the 
ready availability of nonbinding agency interpretations,202 reliably find 
itself in a strong epistemic position with respect to what the agency 
would do, that court would be able to predict with substantial accuracy 
future agency behavior, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood 
that its interpretation will conflict with a later, authoritative 
interpretation.203 A federal court’s epistemic position concerning the 
future behavior of the primary interpretive authority would, on average, 
be markedly better in the administrative than the state law context.204 
For that reason, the decrease in likelihood of conflict resulting from 
adherence to the predictive approach would, on the whole, be 
substantially greater in the former context than in the latter. Third and 
finally, because of the high visibility of nonbinding agency 
interpretations,205 a federal court adhering to the predictive approach 
 
WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 395 (7th ed. 2011) (“Mere obiter 
may be entitled to little weight, while a carefully considered statement by the state court, though 
technically dictum, must carry great weight, and may even, in the absence of any conflicting 
indication of the law of the state, be regarded as conclusive.” (footnote omitted))). The willingness 
of federal courts to dismiss some state court dicta as “mere obiter” plausibly reflects the 
temptation to make state law under the guise of ‘prediction.’ See supra note 143 and 
accompanying text. At the same time, one understands the hesitation to assign significant weight 
to remarks “made in passing.” For that reason, federal courts plausibly do treat an agency’s 
nonbinding views specifically endorsed in the context of immediate litigation as that agency’s 
“official” views. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In so 
doing, federal courts could identify those nonbinding interpretations that reflect current agency 
thinking while simultaneously ensuring that current agency thinking takes into account any issues 
raised by the immediate dispute. See Watts, supra note 13, at 1034 (observing that solicitation of 
agency views through requests for briefing would serve to clarify agency’s informal views in much 
the same way as certification of state law questions serves to clarify content of state law). 
 201 A prescriptive, as opposed to predictive, approach would seem to run directly contrary to 
the more general maxim that “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30 (1983). 
 202 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 203 Subject, of course, to the caveat that an agency’s interpretations are expected to vary over 
time as do that agency’s knowledge and circumstances. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 204 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 205 A major advantage of relying upon legal briefs as the principal source of an agency’s 
“official” though nonbinding interpretations is that it would ensure the visibility of those 
interpretations in the context of litigation. This would be particularly so assuming courts to be 
under a duty to solicit an agency’s views in the form of briefing where relevant. See supra note 
169. Under such a regime, an agency could ensure (so far as it wished) that its nonbinding 
interpretation be taken into consideration by the court. Moreover, since such an interpretation 
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would be much less able in the administrative than in the state context 
to covertly implement its independent judgment concerning the best 
available interpretation under the guise of predicting the interpretation 
that would be preferred by the primary interpretive authority.206 
Because the agency’s preferred interpretation would be plain to view, 
any deviation by the court from that interpretation would be apparent. 
As a result, a court wishing to deviate from a nonbinding agency 
interpretation would incur the substantial burden of having to explain 
why the interpreting agency is unlikely to do what it says that it 
would.207 
In terms of costs, the principal concern with implementing the 
predictive approach in the administrative law context is that it might 
allow an agency to effectively make law without having gone through 
appropriate deliberation. In his dissenting opinion in Mead, Justice 
Scalia objected that one “practical effect” of the majority’s decision 
would be an “artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking,” 
remarking facetiously that one ought to “[b]uy stock in the GPO.”208 
Setting aside the concern about artificiality,209 Justice Scalia was surely 
correct to observe that one of the practical effects—and indeed one of 
the intended consequences—of the decision in Mead was to provide an 
incentive for agencies to engage in “relatively formal administrative 
procedure[s] tending to foster . . . fairness and deliberation.”210 Under 
the Mead majority’s approach, if an agency wants to be confident that it 
will be able to rely upon its preferred interpretation when its actions are 
subjected to judicial review, that agency will articulate that 
interpretation in an instrument having “the force of law.” Because an 
agency can only accomplish this through adherence to fairness and 
deliberation inducing procedures, the majority’s approach thus creates 
 
would be presented by the agency in the context of a brief directed at the specific dispute at issue, 
there could be no question as to the perceived relevance of the interpretation or to the agency’s 
desire to continue to endorse that interpretation in light of the facts of case at hand. 
 206 This would be particularly so where the agency’s interpretation was presented in the form 
of a legal brief filed in the litigation at issue. To reject an interpretation in that context would be 
tantamount to rejecting a state’s highest court’s answer to a certified question of state law, if the 
answers to such questions were treated as formally nonbinding. See Watts, supra note 13, at 1034 
(analogizing solicitation of amicus brief from agency to state law certification). 
 207 To be clear, to say that the non-authoritative interpretation will control in “the vast 
majority” of cases is not to say that it always will. If, for example, an agency wholly failed to 
address a significant concern militating against its interpretation, that might be grounds for a 
court to conclude that the agency would revise its interpretation having gone through the 
procedural formalities of either notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. See 
infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. 
 208 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 246 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 209 Once one conceives of the willingness of agencies to engage in formal procedures as, in 
large part, a function of judicially-set incentives, see infra note 211, it becomes a bit difficult to 
make sense of the notion of a “natural” amount of rulemaking. 
 210 Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 (majority opinion). 
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substantial incentive to prefer formal, over informal, approaches to 
decision-making.211 By contrast, if, as Justice Scalia would have it, an 
agency could be confident that it would receive full deference for an 
interpretation articulated in a nonbinding instrument such as a legal 
brief—instruments that can be produced without adherence to any sort 
of fairness or deliberation inducing procedures—the concern is that that 
agency would have little to no incentive to adhere to such procedures 
when interpreting unclear terms or provisions within the statute(s) that 
it administers.212 Because prediction is a near functional equivalent of 
Justice Scalia’s alternative vision of Chevron, the same concerns about 
fairness and deliberation apply to it as well. After all, so long as an 
agency can be confident that a court will accord de facto deference to an 
interpretation articulated in a nonbinding instrument—in the name of 
predicting that agency’s future behavior—one can reasonably ask what 
incentive an agency would have to adhere to burdensome procedures 
intended to induce fairness and deliberation when arriving at its 
interpretations. 
As to this concern, two responses. First, even if the availability of 
de facto deference for nonbinding interpretations were to make it 
possible for an agency to circumvent indefinitely the procedural 
requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal 
adjudication, it would nevertheless be the case that agencies would be 
required to engage in substantial deliberation. Again, adhering to the 
predictive approach, what a court presented with a nonbinding 
interpretation must ask is whether an agency would continue to adhere 
to that interpretation if it were to address the interpretive question at 
 
 211 As Matthew Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler explain, present practice results in a sort of 
“pay me now or pay me later” dynamic, such that an agency can “pay” either the cost of 
procedural formality ex ante or the cost of exacting judicial review ex post. Stephenson & 
Pogoriler, supra note 181, at 1464 (“This ‘pay me now or pay me later’ principle has gradually 
emerged as a crucial feature of the doctrine, one that allows courts to avoid direct regulation of 
agency choice of policymaking form while retaining some form of meaningful check—either ex 
ante procedural safeguards or ex post judicial scrutiny—on administrative decisions.” (footnote 
omitted)); accord Sunstein, supra note 181, at 225–26 (“Mead puts agencies to a salutary choice; it 
essentially says, ‘Pay me now or pay me later.’ Under Mead, agencies may proceed expeditiously 
and informally, in which case they can invoke Skidmore but not Chevron, or they may act more 
formally, in which case Chevron applies. In either case, the legal system, considered as a whole, 
will provide an ample check on agency discretion and the risk that it will be exercised arbitrarily—
in one case, through relatively formal procedures and in another, through a relatively careful 
judicial check on agency interpretations of law.”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic 
Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 534–35 (2006) (suggesting that Mead creates for 
agencies a tradeoff between procedural formality and textual plausibility). 
 212 The obvious concern is that according deference to non-authoritative interpretations 
would “undermine [Mead’s] doctrinal compromise by enabling agencies to issue [effectively] 
binding legal norms while escaping both procedural constraints and meaningful judicial 
scrutiny.” Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 181, at 1464 (discussing Seminole Rock deference, 
which threatens to undermine the “pay me now or pay me later” dynamic for similar reasons). 
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issue through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
adjudication.213 In making that prediction, one of the things that a court 
must take into account is the fact that interpretations arrived at 
pursuant to either of these sets of procedures may be rejected by a 
reviewing court on the grounds that the accompanying reasoning fails 
to address some significant concern speaking against that 
interpretation.214 As such, while it is true as a rule that a nonbinding 
interpretation contained within an agency legal brief or similar 
instrument will constitute the best available evidence concerning what 
an agency would do if it were to adopt an interpretation that was 
binding, one circumstance in which a court might make an exception to 
that rule would be one in which the reasoning accompanying a given 
nonbinding interpretation fails to address some such concern, insofar as 
the agency would plausibly have to adjust its interpretation in order to 
take that concern into account. Given that possibility, an agency would 
thus retain an incentive to consider and address significant concerns 
pertaining to its preferred interpretation even in a situation where de 
facto deference was available in principle. 
Second and more important, the carrot of interpretive deference is 
not the only incentive available to courts in terms of inducing agencies 
to engage in formal procedures. Though relegated to minimal use under 
prevailing doctrine, courts also have at their disposal the stick of 
rejecting as “arbitrary” and “capricious”215 an agency’s denial of a 
petition for rulemaking. Presently, “‘an agency’s refusal to institute 
rulemaking proceedings is at the high end of the range’ of levels of 
deference” accorded to agency actions when reviewed for arbitrariness 
and capriciousness.216 While a sensible approach in general,217 under a 
 
 213 See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text. 
 214 See, e.g., Ass’n of Private Sector Colls. & Univs. v. Duncan, 681 F.3d 427, 441 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (“A regulation will be deemed arbitrary and capricious, if the issuing agency failed to 
address significant comments raised during the rulemaking.” (citation omitted)); Fox v. Clinton, 
684 F.3d 67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[A court] will not uphold an agency adjudication where the 
agency’s ‘judgment . . . was neither adequately explained in its decision nor supported by agency 
precedent.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Siegel v. SEC, 592 F.3d 147, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2010))). 
 215 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 216 Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 919 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Am. Horse 
Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); see also Lyng, 812 F.2d at 5 (“Such a refusal 
is to be overturned only in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances, which have primarily 
involved plain errors of law, suggesting that the agency has been blind to the source of its 
delegated power . . . .” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 217 As the D.C. Circuit explained: 
[I]n a statutory scheme in which Congress has given an agency various tools with 
which to protect the public interest, [an] agency is entitled to some leeway in choosing 
which jurisdictional base and which regulatory tools will be most effective in advancing 
the Congressional objective. As a corollary of this broad general discretion, [an agency] 
has considerable latitude in responding to requests to institute proceedings or to 
promulgate rules, even though it possesses the authority to do so should it see fit. 
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regime of prediction, an equally sensible exception would be for courts 
to accord substantially less deference—perhaps going so far as to adopt a 
presumption against reasonability—to a denial of a petition for 
rulemaking where an agency has previously sought and received de 
facto interpretive deference for an interpretation adopted pursuant to 
informal procedures.218 By according less or no deference to denials of 
petition in such circumstances, courts could prevent agencies from 
being able to rely, over the long-term, on prediction as a means of 
circumventing the procedural requirements of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.219 While an agency could seek the benefit of de facto 
deference for a nonbinding interpretation in the first instance, going 
forward, an interested party would, by petitioning that agency to engage 
in notice-and-comment rulemaking with respect to the interpretive 
question at issue,220 be able, with the backing of the reviewing court, to 
compel that agency to “put its money where its mouth is,” so to speak.221 
Importantly, whether to be susceptible to such compulsion would 
remain within the discretion of the agency.222 Should an agency desire 
not to be compelled to engage in rulemaking with respect to a particular 
interpretative question, that agency would need only refrain from 
placing its imprimatur on a nonbinding interpretation in the context of 
litigation.223 
 
Administrative rule making does not ordinarily comprehend any rights in private 
parties to compel an agency to institute such proceedings or promulgate rules. 
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 218 This “one bite at the apple” approach bears some resemblance to Judge Friendly’s 
suggestion, rejected by the Supreme Court, that agencies be permitted to set but not change 
agency policy via adjudication. See Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 495–97 (2d Cir. 
1973), rev’d in relevant part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
 219 One admitted cost of the above described “one bite at the apple” approach is that it would 
make it possible for an incumbent administration to insulate to some extent its preferred 
interpretation of a previously uninterpreted term or provision from revision by later 
administrations. Cf. Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial Deference to 
Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 87 (2011) (observing that, 
under a regime in which courts are somewhat less deferential to inconsistent agency 
interpretations, an incumbent administration will be able to “lock in” its preferred interpretation). 
That cost is plausibly less, however, than the cost of permitting agencies to rely upon nonbinding 
interpretations indefinitely. 
 220 Insofar as a party wished to do so at the stage of litigation, a stay pursuant to the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction would be particularly appropriate. 
 221 See supra note 211. 
 222 Thus preserving the flexibility interests that motivate the generally deferential approach to 
judicial review of rulemaking petition denials. See supra note 217. 
 223 As mentioned above, Professor Barron and Justice (then-Professor) Kagan express concern 
that an agency head will be disposed to reflexively endorse in litigation a nonbinding 
interpretation promulgated by her subordinate in, e.g., the context of a final agency action. See 
supra note 196. Assuming the reality of this phenomenon, an agency’s discretion to “refrain from 
placing its imprimatur on a nonbinding interpretation” will, in some cases, be somewhat 
constrained. To be sure, such an inclination to affirm should have little effect in the context of 
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To be clear, even with the above suggested increase in scrutiny of 
denials of petitions for rulemaking, agencies would remain able to 
receive interpretive deference without paying the procedural “cost” over 
the short- to medium-term. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is a 
notoriously time-consuming (and costly) procedure.224 As a result, an 
agency would be able to rely for months or even years on a nonbinding 
interpretation after its initial advancement in litigation as it waited for 
the rulemaking process to play out. What an increase in scrutiny would 
accomplish, however, is the prevention of agencies from being able to 
circumvent deliberation and fairness inducing procedures indefinitely. 
Moreover, it would accomplish this without requiring that courts 
exercise their independent judgment concerning questions of policy, 
questions the authority to answer Congress has delegated elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
According to the theory articulated first in Chevron and again in 
Brand X, a federal court acts as an interpretive subordinate when it 
construes unclear term or provision within an agency-administered 
statute. As the Supreme Court recognized in Brand X, appropriate 
recognition of that subordinate status requires that a court defer to an 
authoritative agency interpretation of some such term or provision 
regardless of any prior judicial interpretation. What the Court has thus 
far failed to recognize, however, is that appropriate recognition of that 
status requires also that, when acting in the absence of an authoritative 
agency interpretation, a court limit itself to predicting how the relevant 
agency would construe the term or provision at issue if it were to do so 
authoritatively. Because interpretations articulated in legally nonbinding 
instruments such as legal briefs constitute readily available evidence 
 
dispute in which the agency is not a party. There, the agency would reserve the option of simply 
declining the court’s invitation to submit an amicus brief, thereby remaining neutral as to any 
previously promulgated nonbinding interpretation, i.e., neither confirming nor denying that any 
previous interpretation was mistaken. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 196, at 259 (discussing 
agency hesitation to admit error). However, in the context of a dispute in which an agency is, for 
example, defending an enforcement action, the choice of whether to affirm a subordinate’s 
interpretation, e.g., “a decline in the morale and loyalty of employees,” id., would be unavoidable. 
Such are the difficult choices faced by an agency head. 
 224 See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short 
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 283–84 (2010) (“[A]s anyone with experience in federal administrative 
practice can attest—completing a single ‘informal’ rulemaking can often take many years and 
consume a great deal of agency and private resources” (footnote omitted)); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1493, 1498 (2012) (“Every study of economically significant rulemakings has found strong 
evidence of ossification—a decisionmaking process that takes many years to complete and that 
requires an agency to commit a high proportion of its scarce resources to a single task.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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concerning how an agency would interpret such a term or provision if it 
were to do so authoritatively, adherence to this predictive approach 
would result in agencies receiving deference for such nonbinding 
interpretations in the vast majority of cases. While that result would 
mostly render moot the Court’s instruction in Mead—that such 
nonbinding interpretations are not to be treated as authoritative—it is a 
result that seems compelled by the Court’s more general theory that 
agencies, not federal courts, retain primary interpretive authority in the 
domain of agency-administered statutes. 
 
